Syndicate content

GDP

Financing Côte d’Ivoire’s Emergence Starts with a Social Contract

Jacques Morisset's picture
Also available in: Français
In Côte d’Ivoire, only 15% of savings are allocated to financial institutions such as banks, microfinance companies, and mobile money accounts.
In Côte d’Ivoire, only 15% of savings are allocated to financial institutions such as banks, microfinance companies, and mobile money accounts. 

The wealthy can borrow money to finance their investment needs because bankers trust them. Those who are less well off, and who need loans the most, do not have this access and must call upon the solidarity of their family and community to finance their investments. The same logic can be used at the country level. High income countries borrow, while many poor African countries have a limited access to international capital markets. In recent years, only one fourth of sub-Saharan African countries were able to issue international bonds—and do not have any other alternative but to solicit international aid.

Un contrat social pour financer l’émergence en Côte d’Ivoire

Jacques Morisset's picture
Also available in: English
In Côte d’Ivoire, only 15% of savings are allocated to financial institutions such as banks, microfinance companies, and mobile money accounts.
En Côte d’Ivoire, seuls 15 % des épargnants ivoiriens placent leurs économies dans les institutions financières telles que les banques, les entreprises de micro-finance et les comptes de mobile money. 

Les personnes fortunées empruntent pour financer leurs investissements car les banques leur font confiance. Ceux qui ont moins de moyen, et qui ont donc davantage besoin de prêts, n'y ont pourtant pas accès et font souvent appel à la solidarité familiale ou communautaire pour leurs investissements. La même logique peut être faite à l’échelle des pays. Ceux à revenu élevé empruntent, tandis que les pays africains à revenu faible n'ont qu'un accès limité aux marchés de capitaux.

Relaunching Africa Can and Sharing Africa’s Growth

Francisco Ferreira's picture

Dear Africa Can readers, we’ve heard from many of you since our former Africa Chief Economist Shanta Devarajan left the region for a new Bank position that you want Africa Can to continue highlighting the economic challenges and amazing successes that face the continent. We agree.

Today, we are re-launching Africa Can as a forum for discussing ideas about economic policy reform in Africa as a useful, if not essential, tool in the quest to end poverty in the region.

You’ll continue to hear from many of the same bloggers who you’ve followed over the past five years, and you’ll hear from many new voices – economists working in African countries and abroad engaging in the evidence-based debate that will help shape reform. On occasion, you’ll hear from me, the new Deputy Chief Economist for the World Bank in Africa.

We invite you to continue to share your ideas and challenge ours in pursuit of development that really works to improve the lives of all people throughout Africa.

Here is my first post. I look forward to your comments.

In 1990, poverty incidence (with respect to a poverty line of $1.25) was almost exactly the same in sub-Saharan Africa and in East Asia: about 57%. Twenty years on, East Asia has shed 44 percentage points (to 13%) whereas Africa has only lost 8 points (to 49%). And this is not only about China: poverty has also fallen much faster in South Asia than in Africa.

These differences in performance are partly explained by differences in growth rates during the 1990s, when emerging Asia was already on the move, and Africa was still in the doldrums. But even in the 2000s, when Africa’s GDP growth picked up to 4.6% or thereabouts, and a number of countries in the region were amongst the fastest-growing nations in the world, still poverty fell more slowly in Africa than in other regions. Why is that?