Infrastructure Economics and Finance

Ces dernières années, de nombreux pays africains ont commencé à faire preuve d’un dynamisme remarquable.

Le taux de croissance  enregistré au Mozambique est fulgurant, affichant une moyenne annuelle de 8 % sur plus de dix ans. Le Kenya est devenu l'un des plus importants fournisseurs mondiaux de fleurs coupées. Le service M-Pesa, qui permet d’effectuer des transferts d’argent à partir d’un téléphone mobile, rencontre un succès grandissant tandis que le programme KickStart aide les petits agriculteurs à irriguer leurs cultures à moindre coût. Le tourisme rwandais fleurit depuis qu’il s’est axé sur la vie des gorilles et dans la ville de Lagos au Nigéria, les nouvelles infrastructures du BRT (réseau de transport rapide par bus) facilite un développement urbain plus efficace. En deux mots, l’Afrique est en train de vivre une réelle transformation.

Much has changed in Zimbabwe since last November. There are signs of recovery following the return of price stability after full dollarization in January. However doubts about the political situation continue to obstruct further recovery.

The most visible sign of improvement is the demise of surreal hyperinflation which according to one estimate peaked at about 80 billion percent. Interestingly, full dollarization initially occurred not because the government chose it as a deliberate stabilization measure.  Exasperated residents simply abandoned the Zimbabwean dollar and moved on to using multiple hard currencies.  In January, the Government too abandoned the Zimbabwean dollar and started using the US Dollar and the South African Rand for both collecting taxes and spending.  Hyperinflation died a natural death in Zimbabwe, it was not tamed.

How much additional foreign aid will it take to prevent the global financial crisis from becoming an economic, social, political and human crisis in Africa?

As my co-authors and I tried to point out in an earlier study of the additional aid needed to reach the Millennium Development Goals, this is not the most important question. Much more important are: (i) what developing country governments can do, and (ii) how the additional resources will be spent. Nevertheless, as world leaders gather for the G-20 summit outside London, the magnitude of additional resources to the world’s poorest continent will be discussed.

In his earlier post on this blog, Ricardo Gazel forecast a 10% decline in Angola’s GDP. This was based on the country’s 2009 budget, which was elaborated before the deepening of the financial crisis and its spillover to the real economy. He now writes:

Since then, OPEC agreed to two production cuts, amounting to a reduction of 244,000 barrels per day or a 13% production cut for Angola. Given the current composition of GDP, if the oil sector shrinks by 13%, the non-oil sector would need to grow at around 22% in order for total GDP to stay flat in 2009. As the non-oil sector depends strongly on public expenditures, and given the dramatic decline in oil revenues expected for 2009, adjustments of the budget are likely to result in a slowdown of the non-oil sector, resulting in a negative growth rate of GDP as a whole in 2009. In nominal terms, with the oil price around $50 a barrel and non-oil sector growing around 10%, GDP would be around 17% lower in 2009 compared to 2008. At $40 a barrel, the decline in nominal GDP comes to 23%.