Thanks for your thoughtful set of comments, Jared. Let me take them para by para. 1. While over the long-term, the relationship between aid and growth is somewhat inconclusive, there seems to be agreement that the relationship has become stronger over the last 10-15 years, which is the period when Africa was experiencing rapid and widespread growth. Incidentally, neither Uganda nor Zambia has unsustainable debt. 2. When I said Africa was "least integrated," I was referring not just to finance, but also to trade, where Africa's trade ratios are lower than, say, East Asia's. But this is precisely why they were the worst hit. Their low trade ratio is a reflection of the fact that these countries are typically trading in one or two primary commodities, so when the price of that commodity falls, the economy is badly hit, since this is the only source of foreign exchange. By contrast, some of the more diversified East Asian countries are less dependent on one or two primary commodities, so that they are not as badly hit (and even if they were, they have more opportunities to adjust) as African countries. 3. I would not characterize the East Asian experience as violating the Washington Consenus. For instance, they all followed prudent macroeconomic policies--low fiscal deficits, positive real interest rates, carefully managed (and often undervalued) exchange rates. Many people refer to the industrial policies that promoted and subsidized exports as examples of East Asian countries' defiance of "orthodoxy." But here too, I have a different take. The existence of externalities in exports is perfectly consistent with neoclassical economics (indeed, it is a cornerstone of welfare economics). When there is a positive externality, the neoclassical (or "orthodox") prescription is to subsidize it. This is exactly what the East Asians did. The problem is that many African countries, too, tried to subsidize industries (using the same externality arguments as did the East Asians), but the result was a colossal failure--with the subsidies going to politically-connected, but economically unproductive enterprises, etc., etc. It is to avoid this "government failure" that some of us are skeptical about re-introducing industrial policy in Africa. As you can see, it is this skepticism that is the departure from orthodoxy, not the desire to subsidize externalities. 4. Finally, it is because absorptive capacity is low that the fiscal stimulus packages of Uganda and many other African countries have been so modest. Keep in mind that the U.S.'s fiscal stimulus leaves it with a deficit of 10 percent of GDP, whereas those of African countries are in the 2-3 percent range.