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Europe and Central Asia

A glimpse into state financial institution ownership in Europe and Central Asia

Aurora Ferrari's picture

State-owned financial institutions (SOFIs) are back in vogue. Although the theoretical and empirical debate on state ownership in finance may continue to sway back and forth, the 2007–08 global financial crisis renewed policy makers’ interest in SOFIs as a policy instrument.

This interest is particularly visible in countries in Europe and Central Asia (ECA), where policy makers have turned to SOFIs for countercyclical interventions, as quantitative easing appears to have little impact on economic growth; the cost of bailing out privately-owned financial institutions has mounted; and many countries face significant fiscal constraints. From the publicly-owned British Business Bank (established to assist smaller businesses), to the Investment Plan for Europe (the “Juncker Plan,” which relies on “National Promotional Banks” to intermediate resources from the European Fund for Strategic Investments), SOFIs have been used to fill perceived gaps or complement the public policy toolkit.

The ‘safety trap’ and Eurozone secular stagnation

Biagio Bossone's picture

The ‘safety trap’ hypothesis and secular stagnation 

Noting that Eurozone inflation has been declining for almost a year, and constantly undershooting forecasts, Landau (2104) suggests that underpinning those evolutions, including the lack of growth, might be one factor: an excess demand for ‘safe assets’. Essentially — Landau argues — agents have responded to extreme risk aversion by developing a strong inclination for holding liquid and safe assets (typically money and government bonds). In order to accumulate more of these assets, they have reduced consumption and investment, thus depressing aggregate demand. When inflation is low and the economy hits the zero lower bound (ZLB), interest rates cannot reach their (negative) equilibrium levels and the economy falls into what Landau refers to as a ‘safety trap’, with cumulative disinflation, increasing real interest rates, and depression setting in. This sounds as a plausible explanation for secular stagnation in the Eurozone.

Do Rigidities in Employment Protection Stifle Entry into Export Markets?

Murat Seker's picture

Editor's Note: Murat Seker recently presented the findings of the paper discussed in the following blog post at a session of the FPD Academy. Please see the FPD Academy page on the All About Finance blog for more information on this monthly World Bank event series.

Many studies point to the importance of firms that export to economic growth and development. These firms tend to be larger, more productive, and grow faster than non-exporting firms. These findings have focused policymakers’ attention on the importance of international trade for economic growth. From the 1980s to the 2000s traditional trade policies have improved significantly—applied tariff rates across a wide range of countries with varying levels of income have decreased from around 25 percent to 10 percent. However, improvements in trade policies are often not enough to reap the full benefits of international trade. To be fully effective, they require complementary reforms that improve the business environment for firms. In a recent paper on Rigidities in Employment Protection and Exporting, I focus on a particular aspect of the business environment, namely employment protection legislation (EPL), and show how these regulations relate to the decisions of firms to enter export markets.1

Evidence shows that export market entry is associated with significant changes and adjustments in firm performance around the time at which exporting begins. In data collected via the Enterprise Surveys project, the employment levels of firms that subsequently enter export markets ("future-exporters") grow by 13%, four times higher than the growth rate of firms that don’t enter export markets.2 Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that the growth premium for these future-exporters as compared to non-exporters in the U.S. is 1.4% per year for employment and 2.4% for shipments.

Prospects for Recovery in Eastern Europe

Ryan Hahn's picture

According to a new paper by World Bank economists Paulo Correa and Mariana Iootty, the recovery won't look pretty. The financial crisis and concomitant global economic crisis have had a disproportionately harsh impact on young and innovative firms in Eastern Europe, and this does not bode well for future growth prospects.

A few weeks ago, our corner of the World Bank hosted an event where Correa and Iootty presented their findings. (This was the first in a new series called FPD Academy that will highlight excellent new analytical work on financial and private sector development.) Video of the event appears below the jump. The presentation itself starts at 4:30 and runs to 27:30. A discussant provides remarks immediately after the presentation, and a Q&A follows. 

What Will Economic Recovery Look Like in Eastern Europe?

Paulo Correa's picture

Editor's Note: The following post was contributed by Paulo Correa, Lead Economist for Private Sector Development in the Europe and Central Asia Region of the World Bank.

International debate on the financial crisis has shifted attention to the potential drivers of the future economic recovery. The countries of Eastern Europe were hit hard by the global financial crisis, after having long enjoyed abundant international financing and large inflows of foreign direct investment that brought them high rates of growth, mainly through the expansion of domestic consumption. With the slowing of international trade and the indefinite tightening of financial conditions, sustained economic recovery will depend to a greater extent on productivity gains and growth in exports. 

Two important sources of expansion in firms’ productivity are learning and R&D. Economic research tells us that, depending on size and survival rate, younger firms tend to grow faster than older firms. Because the learning process presents diminishing returns, younger firms, which are in the early phases of learning, will learn faster and thus achieve higher productivity gains than older firms. Innovative firms are expected to grow faster too – R&D tends to enhance firm-productivity, while innovation leads to better sales performance and a higher likelihood of exporting.