Syndicate content

access to finance

Access to finance and job growth

Maria Soledad Martinez Peria's picture

The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the impact of credit markets on the real economy, in particular on employment. While an extensive literature exists on how finance can affect corporate investment and overall economic growth, comparatively little is known about the effect of finance on labor market outcomes. 

In a recent paper, entitled “Access to Finance and Job Growth: Firm-Level Evidence across Developing Countries” Meghana Ayyagari, Pedro Juarros, Sandeep Singh and I use comprehensive firm-level data across a large set of developing countries to analyze the impact of access to finance on job growth and the heterogeneity in this relationship across firm size.[1] In particular, we study the differential impact of access to finance on MSMEs’ ability to create jobs relative to that of larger firms.

Does the introduction of movable collateral registries increase firms’ access to finance?

Maria Soledad Martinez Peria's picture

To reduce asymmetric information problems associated with extending credit and increase the chances of loan repayment, banks typically require collateral from their borrowers. 

Movable assets often account for most of the capital stock of private firms and comprise an especially large share for micro, small, and medium-size enterprises. Hence, movable assets are the main type of collateral that firms, especially those in developing countries, can pledge to obtain bank financing. While a sound legal and regulatory framework is essential to allow movable assets to be used as collateral, without a well-functioning registry for movable assets, even the best secured transactions laws could be ineffective or even useless.

Given the importance of collateral registries for moveable assets, 18 countries have established such registries in the past decade. However, to my knowledge there is no systematic empirical evidence on whether such reforms have been effective in fulfilling their primary goal: improving firms’ access to bank finance.

How to Deepen Financial Systems in Africa: All financial sector policy is local

Thorsten Beck's picture

Editor’s Note: This is the fifth and final contribution in a series of posts that preview the findings of the forthcoming Financing Africa: Through the Crisis and Beyond regional flagship report, a comprehensive review documenting current and new trends in Africa’s financial sectors and taking into account Africa’s many different experiences. The report was prepared by the African Development Bank, the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank. In this post, the authors argue that all financial sector reform has to start locally, taking into account political constraints, but also aiming to create a constituency for financial sector reform.

What has the recent crisis taught us about the role of finance in the growth process of countries? The global crisis and the ensuing Great Recession have put in doubt the paradigm that financial deepening is good for growth under any circumstance. For students of financial systems, the bright (growth-enhancing) and dark (instability) sides of financial development go hand in hand. The same mechanism through which finance helps growth also makes finance susceptible to shocks and, ultimately, fragility.

When Credit is More Than Just Financing: The Case of Trade Credit Contracts

Leora Klapper's picture

As most manufacturers around the world can attest, trade credit is an important source of external financing for firms of all sizes. Suppliers—some of whom may be small or credit constrained—generally offer working capital financing to their buyers, reported as accounts receivables (e.g. McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). Research has also demonstrated that trade credit can act as a substitute for bank credit during periods of monetary tightening or financial crisis (see, for example, Love et al., 2007).

Trade credit, however, is not used for financing purposes alone. Trade credit, it has been argued, is a way for a supplier to engage in price discrimination, giving favored or more powerful clients longer terms (see, for example, Giannetti, Burkart, and Ellingsen, 2011). Furthermore, trade credit may simply be customary in an industry, with this particular custom driven by economic rationales such as allowing buyers time to assess the quality of the supplied goods (Lee and Stowe, 1993).

How a Mere Fingerprint Can Boost Loan Repayment Threefold

Xavier Gine's picture

If I told you that people respond to incentives you’d probably think I’m stating the obvious. But if I told you that a simple intervention raised the repayment rate among risky borrowers by more than threefold, you’d perhaps be more surprised.

Malawi—like many other Sub-Saharan African countries—suffers from limited access to formal credit, especially in rural areas. Part of the problem is that the typical microfinance loan is not well suited for agriculture. For example, lenders cannot schedule frequent repayments because farmers receive cash flows only after the harvest, several months after the loan is taken. Similarly, all farmers need cash at the same time to purchase inputs, so allowing some farmers to borrow only after others have repaid their loans would mean that some farmers would end up receiving credit when they do not need it.

Which Households Use Banks? And Does Bank Privatization Make a Difference?

Thorsten Beck's picture

Access to banking services is viewed as a key determinant of economic well-being for households, especially in low-income countries. Savings and credit products make it easier for households to align income and expenditure patterns across time, to insure themselves against income and expenditure shocks, as well as to undertake investments in human or physical capital. Up to now, however, there is little cross-country evidence which documents how the use of financial services differs across households and, in particular, how cross-country variation in the structure of the financial sector affects the types of households which are banked. In a recent paper with Martin Brown, we use survey data from 28 transition economies and Turkey to:

  1. document the use of formal banking services (bank accounts, bank cards and mortgages) across these 29 countries in 2006 and 2010,
  2. relate this use to an array of household characteristics,
  3. gauge the relationship between changes in bank ownership and the financial infrastructure (deposit insurance and creditor protection) over time within a country and changes in the use of banking services, and
  4. assess how cross-country variation in bank ownership structures, deposit insurance and creditor protection affect the composition of the banked population.

Should State Banks Continue to Play a Role in the Middle East and North Africa?

Roberto Rocha's picture

In the past three decades the role of state-owned banks has been sharply reduced in most emerging economies. This reflects a general disappointment with their financial performance and contribution to financial and economic development, especially in countries where they dominated the banking system. But despite their loss of market share, state banks still play a substantial role in many regions, especially in East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia (figure 1).

Figure 1 Share of state banks in total assets by region, various years, 1970–2005


The arguments put forward to justify the continuing presence of state banks have included market failures (resulting from asymmetric information and poor enforcement of contracts) that restrict access to credit; the provision of essential financial services in remote areas (where supply may be restricted by large fixed costs); and the provision of countercyclical finance to prevent an excessive contraction of credit during a financial crisis. These arguments may well justify policy interventions in many countries, although it does not necessarily follow that state banks are the optimal intervention. Moreover, even where the presence of state banks may be justified, policy makers still face the challenge of ensuring clear mandates and sound governance structures in order to minimize political interference and avoid large financial losses.

Microcredit, microsavings…but what about micropayments?

Ignacio Mas's picture

Why is the term microfinance still used by so many as if it were synonymous with microcredit? Credit is only one form of finance. All the more thoughtful commentators on the Andhra Pradesh crisis agree that debt should not be the only financing option available to poor people.

In a recent blog post, my colleague Jake Kendall and I explained how the Financial Services for the Poor team at the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation focuses on savings because it’s an option that everyone should have and because we felt donors have neglected it in the past.

But there is another service that has received even less attention from the microfinance community: payments. When is the last time you were at a microfinance conference and someone mentioned the payment needs of the poor with any degree of passion? And why do academic researchers devote so little attention to it?

Lending to Bank Insiders: Crony Capitalism or a Fast Track to Financial Development?

Bob Cull's picture

Bankers often extend credit to firms owned by their close business associates, members of their own families or clans, or businesses that they themselves own. On the one hand, this allows banks to overcome information asymmetries and creates mechanisms for bankers to monitor borrowers. But on the other hand, related lending makes it possible for insiders—bank directors—to expropriate value from outsiders, be they minority shareholders, depositors, or taxpayers (when there is under-funded deposit insurance). The evidence suggests that during an economic crisis insiders have strong incentives to loot the resources of the bank to rescue their other enterprises, thereby expropriating value from outsiders. In a crisis, loan repayment by unrelated parties worsens, and banks thus find it more difficult to reimburse depositors and continue operations. Consequently, insiders perform a bit of self-interested triage: they make loans to themselves, and then default on those loans in order to save their non-bank enterprises. Outsiders, of course, know that they may be expropriated, and therefore behave accordingly: they refrain from investing their wealth in banks, either as shareholders or depositors. The combination of tunneling by directors, the resulting instability of the banking system, and the reluctance of outsiders to entrust their wealth in banks results in a small banking system.

And yet, the economic histories of many developed countries (the United States, Germany, and Japan) indicate strongly that related lending had a positive effect on the development of banking systems. If related lending is pernicious, why then did it characterize the banking systems of advanced industrial countries during their periods of rapid growth? In fact, related lending is still widespread in those same countries.

The AAF Virtual Debates: Charles Calomiris's Response on State-Owned Banks

Charles Calomiris's picture

I have to admit, I am a bit puzzled by my friend Franklin Allen’s first entry in this debate. There simply is no evidence—none—in support of his statement that mixed systems of state and private banking tend to be a good idea. And his mention of China is doubly puzzling. China’s state-owned banks have been a disaster, fiscally, allocatively, and socially. They cost the Chinese people hundreds of billions of dollars in bailout costs a decade ago, and, according to most informed observers, may very well soon repeat a similar magnitude of losses. Allocatively, they are famously wasteful of resources, as they have been a political tool for propping up the unproductive state-owned sector, which explains their continuing huge losses (recognized and unrecognized). The internal corporate governance of these unwieldy institutions is a nightmare. The financing arrangements that have succeeded in attracting private capital are well understood to be a political deal between global banks and the Chinese government; global banks invest in the state-owned sector as part of the price they must pay for entry into the Chinese market. And these banks are the central nexus of corruption and influence peddling in Chinese society. China’s growth has occurred in spite of these banks’ distorted lending policies, not because of them.

Some observers have wondered how it was possible for China to grow despite the lack of a deep private formal lending sector. The answer is simple: If a country’s basic economic development is constrained for centuries, then when economic liberalization finally occurs, the marginal product of capital is huge and high returns can be generated from almost any reasonably well-managed enterprise. If retained earnings can reliably earn high annual returns irrespective of how they are invested, growth will be rapid even without a banking system. But that initial bank-independent growth is not sustainable. The Chinese government’s recent financial policy initiatives show that it is well aware that China’s continuing growth is highly dependent on its ability to develop the legal, political, and institutional foundations that will support increasingly selective, private, arms-length lending for productive investments. That transformation of the Chinese banking system is a future prospect, not a current reality, and it is by no means a certainty (see, for example, Minxin Pei’s book, China’s Trapped Transition, or the contributions to my edited volume, China’s Financial Transition at the Crossroads).