Since the global financial crisis, credit to the private nonfinancial sector in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) has surged. Within this overall surge, however, there has been considerable divergence between commodity-exporting and -importing economies. In commodity-importing EMDEs, credit-to-GDP ratios are high by historical standards but are now stable or declining. In commodity-exporting EMDEs, in contrast, credit growth has been near a pace associated with past credit booms, but private sector credit levels are still moderate, and, with a few exceptions, still well below thresholds identified as warning signs.
Institutional investors have become the majority owners of most large corporations and are expected to play a key role for financial development by providing funding for firms, enhancing market liquidity through more active trading, and by promoting better corporate governance in the companies in which they invest.
For developing countries, while most of the literature has focused on the impact of foreign institutional investors on capital markets, little is known about the relation between domestic institutional investors and trading activity, transactions costs, and governance practices. Understanding the role of domestic investors is particularly important since in many of these countries, business groups, which are typically collections of publicly traded companies with significant amount of common ownership, dominate private sector activity. In such context, money management institutions which belong to these business groups are prone to conflicts of interest between their fiduciary responsibilities and the objectives of their own management. For example, business groups’ relations can be used by controlling managers as a mechanism to enhance the entrenchment of corporate control. Alternatively, an institutional investor which belongs to a business group might have access to private information in affiliated firms. Ownership concentration and business group ties potentially exacerbates information asymmetries, discouraging investment.
Giant leaps in financial inclusion driven by private sector innovation and supportive regulation have made Kenya a case study in financial sector development. A new book brings together a group of academics to investigate the myriad of dimensions of and issues that lie beneath Kenya’s much-touted financial inclusion success story. The book is available at this link: Kenya’s Financial Transformation in the 21st Century.
Kenya: A World Leader in Financial Inclusion?
Headline figures from survey data place Kenya at the top of the financial inclusion index both regionally and globally. Data from the last Global Findex survey shows that 75% of Kenyan adults have a formal account that allows them to save, send or receive money. In 2014 Kenya outperformed both the global average and many middle-income countries such as Chile, Brazil, India, Mexico and Russia.
Unemployment often rises during an economic crisis and policymakers take a range of actions to try to mitigate this increase. For example, 22 countries around the world used some form of wage subsidy program to promote employment retention during the recent crisis. Many studies have looked at the effect of wage subsidies on employment in non-crisis times, with mixed findings. But, there is not much evidence on whether wage subsidies can raise employment in the wake of a crisis.
Conceptually, wage subsidies during a crisis may make sense since layoffs could slow down the recovery as re-hiring and training workers may be costly for firms. This is particularly true for workers with job-specific skills. For these workers, it may be beneficial for firms to not let them go in the first place. However, as firms face lower demand for their products, they may not have the financial means to keep paying these workers, particularly in the presence of credit constraints, which are often exacerbated during a crisis. This is where wage subsidies come in. But, ultimately, we just don’t know whether these subsidies really cause firms to retain workers they otherwise would not have retained.
The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the impact of credit markets on the real economy, in particular on employment. While an extensive literature exists on how finance can affect corporate investment and overall economic growth, comparatively little is known about the effect of finance on labor market outcomes.
In a recent paper, entitled “Access to Finance and Job Growth: Firm-Level Evidence across Developing Countries” Meghana Ayyagari, Pedro Juarros, Sandeep Singh and I use comprehensive firm-level data across a large set of developing countries to analyze the impact of access to finance on job growth and the heterogeneity in this relationship across firm size. In particular, we study the differential impact of access to finance on MSMEs’ ability to create jobs relative to that of larger firms.
Access to finance is an important tool against poverty since it allows for the smoothing of consumption. The equality of access amongst different groups in the society is also crucial in terms of correctly allocating the positive benefits of improved financial services.
In a recent paper published in the World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series we proposed and computed an Equity Adjusted Coverage rate (EACR) for a range of financial inclusion indicators in Turkey. This work complements the conventional coverage or use of financial services by adjusting for the equity of its coverage, on the basis of a set of `circumstances’. The characteristics or circumstances that are accounted for, in Turkey’s case, are gender, age, education, income quintile, and urban/rural.
Every day more and more people in the world have access to financial services. In the minds of many, that poses an important risk. People need financial education, particularly in the form of information, to prevent them from making dangerous financial mistakes. They need to be aware of fees they pay, the interest rate charged by their credit cards, and important clauses in the contracts they sign.
The funny thing is, not even people we consider financially savvy know those things. I put these kinds of questions to 30 Mexican economists, all PhDs working in the financial sector or in academia. 38% did not know the APR of their credit cards. 66% did not know approximately how much they paid last year in fees to retirement fund managers. 72% claimed they do not usually read the fine print in bank contracts.
Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often face financial constraints because they lack audited statements and other information about their operations, and as a result, financial institutions have difficulties assessing the risk of lending to them. Studies have shown that information sharing, credit bureaus, and credit scoring can increasing credit to SMEs, but not all countries have well-developed credit bureaus that gather the level of information needed to build a reliable credit-scoring model. For example, the average credit bureau in Latin America and the Caribbean complies with only half of best practices and covers only 40.5 percent of the adult population (Doing Business Report 2016).
Our paper studies the existence of political rents in bank lending in Mexico. Unlike prior studies examining political rent seeking in public sector banks, we focus on an economy with a fully privatized banking sector where the existence of political rent seeking is not obvious.
The data that we use corresponds to the universe of commercial bank loans in Mexico from 2003 to 2012. We classify firms as politically connected if they are located in a state that elected a senator who at a particular time chaired an important senate committee. 1 We then narrow down our definition of political connection by focusing on firms that, in addition to being headquartered in the same state, operate in an industry related to the purview of the chairman’s commission, or are located in the same municipality in which the chairman lives. Having this classification of political connection allows us to exploit within-firm variation over time, and compare a firm’s loan terms and performance when it is politically connected and when it is not.
In “Securities Trading by Banks and Credit Supply: Micro-Evidence”, we explore the effects of the financial crisis on securities trading by commercial banks and the subsequent effect of the latter in credit supply. We find that banks with higher trading expertise increase their investments in securities in crises and decrease their supply of credit.
Banks today hold a considerable amount of securities among their assets. However, there is an important policy and academic debate as to whether they should be able to do so. The investment behavior of banks is portrayed in Figure 1, where was a sharp decline in price in the security around 2009; at the same time, German banks with higher trading expertise increased their holdings of said security.