Syndicate content

Has executive compensation contributed to the financial crisis?

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt's picture

The Question: Has executive compensation contributed to the financial crisis?

In the aftermath of the financial crisis there has been no shortage of finger-pointing in the attempt to identify its underlying causes. The list of potential culprits is long and ranges from bank deregulation to the “alchemy” of credit ratings and structured finance. This debate focuses on one factor that has allegedly contributed to the crisis: greedy bankers and the executive compensation packages that tempted them to, quite literally, bet the bank.

The spectacular collapse of banks whose executives were allegedly paid for performance clearly raises many questions about the link between executive pay and risk-taking. In a recent paper, Thomas Philippon and Ariell Reshef of New York University show that while in 1980 bankers made no more than their counterparts in other parts of the economy, by 2000 wages in the financial sector were 40% higher for employees with the same formal qualifications. The last time such a discrepancy was observed was just prior to the Great Depression—an irony which has not been lost on critics of bank compensation, ranging from regulators to the Occupy Wall Street protesters. But the level of compensation alone may not be the real problem. Many leading economists (see, for instance, op-eds from Alan Blinder and Raghuram Rajan) have emphasized that a much more important (and difficult) question to answer is how the structure of performance pay may encourage excessive risk-taking at all levels of the institution, from traders and underwriters right up to the firm’s CEO.

An Economy that Works: Creating jobs for the 40+ million unemployed

Susan Lund's picture

Editor’s Note: The following is a guest contribution by Susan Lund, Director of Research at the McKinsey Global Institute. She will be speaking at the World Bank on the topic of job creation on January 24 as part of the FPD Chief Economist Talk series.

Perhaps no topic is more pressing today than the growing jobs and employment problem. We estimate that there are 40 million unemployed in high-income countries and tens of millions more who have dropped out of the workforce or are under-employed. Not only does this exact a toll in human misery and dampen lifetime economic prospects, but it also places a drag on aggregate demand and tax receipts at a time when both are sorely needed.

Unfortunately, these 40 million may just be the foretaste of what could be in store. Increasingly, the job market in developed economies is bifurcating: full-time employment, job security and rising incomes for high-skill, technically trained, and entrepreneurial workers—and the opposite for almost everyone else. Factories are becoming places of many robots and a few high-skill technicians. The modern office is becoming more virtual—a network of task specialists who may work remotely and are increasingly likely to be part-time or contract labor. Shops are online; those made of brick and mortar increasingly are self-serve and self-checkout.

Economic Development and the Evolving Importance of Banks and Stock Markets

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt's picture

How should the relative importance of banks and stock markets change as countries develop?  Is there an optimal financial structure—in other words, should the mixture of financial institutions and markets change to reflect the evolving needs of economies as they develop?

Previous research has found that both the operation of banks and the functioning of securities markets influence economic development (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Levine and Zervos, 1998), suggesting that banks provide different services to the economy from those provided by securities markets. Indeed, banks generally have a comparative advantage in financing shorter term, lower risk, well collateralized investments, while arms length markets are relatively better suited in designing custom financing for more novel, longer run and higher risk projects.

However, economic theory also emphasizes the importance of financial structure, i.e., the mixture of financial institutions and markets operating in an economy. For example, Allen and Gale’s (2000) theory of financial structure and their comparative analyses of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States suggest that (1) banks and markets provide different financial services; (2) economies at different stages of economic development require different mixtures of these financial services to operate effectively; and (3) if an economy’s actual mixture of banks and markets differs from the “optimal” structure, the financial system will not provide the appropriate blend of financial services, with adverse effects on economic activity.

Alice in Euroland: What next for Europe’s rapidly shrinking banks?

Inci Otker-Robe's picture

Less than six years ago, policymakers were concerned about a credit boom in central and eastern Europe (see, e.g., Enoch and Otker-Robe, 2007). Now, as the Eurozone debt crisis has taken center stage and bank deleveraging has picked up speed, they worry about a massive credit crunch across Europe, with potentially damaging spillover effects around the world.

How did we get here? How big is the problem? And what is the way forward?

The 2008-09 Crisis: From credit crescendo…

A combination of complex global and domestic factors including structural global imbalances, incentives supported by economic policies and implicit government or supra-national guarantees, and industry practices allowed massive amounts of easy credit to flow from domestic and international sources to doubtful parts of the private sector such as risky mortgages and real estate projects, triggering unsustainable credit booms and asset bubbles across the world. (Much has been written on the topic. See, for example, Brunnermeier 2009, or Obstfeld and Rogoff 2009).

Triggering Disruptive Innovation in Retail Banking in the Digital Age

Ignacio Mas's picture

See what a profound transformation the internet is producing in information-based sectors. Newspapers are under threat from online news sources and blogs. These same web destinations are becoming less relevant as people simply lift and filter the information they want using RSS feeds. The music CD is being unbundled as customers buy individual tracks online. These songs get remixed and re-distributed across an ever-growing number of online content repositories. Books are increasingly digitized, and customers can now sample content and search for information across entire libraries.

The internet is a destroyer of digital products but a great creator of new kinds of customer experiences. Power has shifted to users: it’s no longer about the packages of content suppliers want to sell but about the content mash-ups users want to consume. Providers’ best response is to try to extract more customer information with each interaction, and use that to deliver even more relevance and convenience to their customers. Think Google and Apple and Amazon: the new corporate battlefield lies in the control of the user interface and the customer intelligence system that supports it.

Yet there is one information-based sector that seems deaf to the great sucking sound of the internet: banking. What is banking but managing information of who has what financial claims on whom? For banking, the internet truly is still just another channel. Sure, it has added transactional convenience, but has it changed how banks talk to us?

What Do We Know about the Impact of Tax Reforms on Private Sector Development?

Miriam Bruhn's picture

I recently conducted a literature review on the impact of tax reforms on private sector development as part of the Investment Climate Impact Project.1 My goal was to take stock of what is currently known about the impact of reforms that the World Bank is supporting in this area and to identify the gaps in knowledge that we ought to fill by conducting more impact evaluations. While tax reforms can have a broad range of effects in the economy, the focus here was on private sector outcomes only, as measured by investment, tax evasion by formal firms, formal firm creation, and firms’ economic performance.

It turns out that most papers in this area study the impact of changing tax rates. Both cross-country and micro-level  studies suggest that lowering tax rates can increase investment, reduce tax evasion, promote formal firm creation and ultimately lead to an increase in firms’ sales and GDP growth overall. However, lowering tax rates also has important implications for government revenue and it is thus often difficult to balance the trade-offs between various goals of public policy.

Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead

Augusto de la Torre's picture

This is not exactly the perfect moment for banks to take on new risks. In such a volatile economic climate as today’s, the seemingly prudent thing would be to do very little. But, in a new World Bank report, Financial Development in Latin America and the Caribbean: The Road Ahead, we argue that the time is right for the financial sector in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to expand sustainably in new directions, to boost economic activity and financial inclusion.

LAC has demonstrated a strong financial footing, having weathered the global crisis of 2008-2009 better than most. After a history of recurring instability, the region’s strengthening of macroeconomic and financial oversight policies helped prevent toxic loans and U.S.-style bubbles. In fact, during the 1980s and 90s, the financial sector was the region’s Achilles heel. Ever since, the financial systems have grown and deepened, becoming more integrated and competitive, with new actors, markets, and instruments flourishing. Now that the successes of LAC’s macro-financial stability are widely recognized and tested, we believe it is the right time to move forward with a broader agenda.

But greater financial stability and resilience has not translated into increased financial services, as compared to the world. Even when savings have accumulated and funds are available for investment.

Should Development Organizations be Hunting Gazelles?

David McKenzie's picture

Last week I presented some early findings from ongoing work at the IADB, at Innovations for Poverty Action’s SME initiative inaugural conference. There was a lot of interesting discussion about early results from efforts to improve management and skills in small and medium firms, discussion of the most appropriate ways of financing these firms and the extent to which a personal vs automated approach to determining creditworthiness can be used, and an interesting panel on policies towards the missing middle. However, the one theme that has got me thinking the most is something that seems to come up a lot in discussions of microenterprise development and SME programs recently, namely should development institutions and policymakers be directing fewer resources at microfirms and more at high-growth-potential enterprises or gazelles?

Gazelles are defined by the OECD to be all enterprises up to 5 years old with average annualised growth greater than 20% per annum, over a three year period, and which have 10 or more workers. Recent work in the US, and looking at firms around the world have emphasized the role of a subset of dynamic, fast-growing young firms in net job creation, leading to policymakers and practioners focused on job creation to think we should be devoting more effort to identifying and supporting these gazelles, and decrying the lack of venture capital markets in developing countries. For example, see this scoping note by Tom Gibson and Hugh Stevenson at the IFC.

Informal Networks and Shadow Banking: Policy Implications

Robert Townsend's picture

Panel data can be used to measure directly or infer indirectly the presence and role of informal financial networks. In the Townsend Thai data (a collection of over 12 years of annual panel data for 900 households in 64 Thai) villages, networks are shown to play a beneficial role in smoothing consumption and investment against income and cash flow fluctuations. Villagers who lack formal financial access but are indirectly connected through networks receive the benefits of the formal financial system. Surveys of financial access  that ignore these networks can understate the reach of financial access while hiding the needs of the truly vulnerable (e.g., poor households without any kin in their village). Complementarities between the formal financial system and informal networks show up in bridge loans for repayment and the transactions demand for cash, revealing highly active informal money markets.

The same logic and data make labor supply and hours data conform with those of a sophisticated risk syndicate and make the rate of returns on investment/occupations conform with the theory of modern finance—in particular a capital asset pricing model applied to technologies/occupations with common market/village risk. We found that families engaged in occupations like rice farming require a higher expected return because this activity does well only when the village as a whole is doing well, and conversely occupations which are not covariate with market risk are recognized as particularly valuable. However, heterogeneous risk preferences creates a policy warning: outside insurance targeting village/market risk can actually make some in a village worse off, those had been providing insurance to others.

Has the Global Banking System Become More Fragile Over Time?

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt's picture

The last decade has seen a tremendous transformation in the global financial sector. Globalization, innovations in communications technology and de-regulation have led to significant growth of financial institutions around the world. These trends had positive economic benefits in the form of increased productivity, increased capital flows, lower borrowing costs, and better price discovery and risk diversification. But the same trends have also lead to greater linkages across financial institutions around the world as well as an increase in exposure of these institutions to common sources of risk. The recent financial crisis has demonstrated that financial institutions around the world are highly inter-connected and that vulnerabilities in one market can easily spread to other markets outside of national boundaries.

In a recent paper my co-author Deniz Anginer and I examine whether the global trends described above have led to an increase in co-dependence in default risk of commercial banks around the world. The growing expansion of financial institutions beyond national boundaries over the past decade has resulted in these institutions competing in increasingly similar markets, exposing them to common sources of market and credit risk. During the same period, rapid development of new financial instruments has created new channels of inter-dependency across these institutions. Both increased interconnections and common exposure to risk makes the banking sector more vulnerable to economic, liquidity and information shocks.

Pages