The actual distribution of world income across countries is extremely unequal, much higher than the within country inequality faced by most countries. The question studied in this paper is: How do international policies on aid, trade, and factor movements affect the international distribution of income?… In brief, there is a contradiction in international policies where aid's equality-enhancing effect is somewhat offset by protectionism.
Comments are being accepted on the World Bank Group's governance and anticorruption strategy.
St Helena was always as aid-dependent as it is today. Between the early 1900s and the mid-1960s the island's major industry was growing flax, or hemp, which was used to make ropes. Although there were ups and downs in the industry as world prices changed, it was the island's largest employer, apart from the government. In 1966 the whole industry suddenly closed down.
A new EBRD working paper by Libor Krkoska and Katrin Robeck on ‘The impact of crime on the enterprise sector: Transition versus non-transition countries’:
Peter Eigen, the founder of Transparency International and now a member of Tony Blair's Africa Progress Panel, will be guest blogging next week on the Herald Tribune's blog: Managing Globalization. This week you can ask him your questions about corruption, development and the future of Africa.
Update: Here is the first round of Q&A.
Reforming an African electricity company requires tough love, persistence -- and a little luck. Just ask Jean-David Bile, a civil engineer in the central African country of Cameroon. Bile runs AES Corp.'s electricity operation in Cameroon, a national grid that is chiefly powered by two large dams and was formerly fully owned by the infamously corrupt government of Cameroon.
Joel Waldfogel writes in Slate about the new NBER working paper: Does Corruption Produce Unsafe Drivers? - and it has caused lots of discussion.
Empirical results show that governance plays a significant role in private investment decisions. This result is particularly true in the case of "administrative quality" in the form of control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, investment-friendly profile of administration, and law and order, as well as for "political stability." Evidence in favor of "public accountability" seems, however, less robust.
Ugo Panizza and Monica Yanez ask why Latin Americans are so unhappy about pro-market reforms. Theory #1:
What matters is the difference between expectations and actual outcome. Policymakers may have made the mistake of overselling the reforms by promising too much, and the disillusionment with reforms documented in this paper could be due to unmet expectations.