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Economic Productivity

India’s remarkably robust and resilient growth story

Poonam Gupta's picture

India has achieved much in the last decades. Yet an economic deceleration in the past few quarters has generated worried commentaries about India’s growth potential.  However, our analysis of nearly five decades of data finds that India’s long-term growth process is steady, stable, diversified and resilient. Does this lay the groundwork for a more sustained 8% growth in the future? Yes, possibly, but more is needed. Let us elaborate.

First, India’s long-term economic growth has steadily accelerated over a fifty-year period, without any prolonged reversals. Thus, while growth averaged 4.4 percent a year during the 1970s and 1980s, it accelerated to 5.5 percent during the 1990s-early 2000s, and further to 7.1 percent in the past one decade. The acceleration of growth is evident not just for aggregate GDP, but even more strongly for per capita GDP. The average pace of per capita growth was 5.5 percent a year in the last decade. Interestingly, when compared with some of the world’s largest emerging economies, this steady acceleration of growth stands out as being unique to India.

Second, India’s rate of growth has become more stable. This is partly due to the stabilization of growth within each sector – agriculture, industry and services – and partly to the transition of the economy toward the services sector, where growth is more stable. Particularly interesting is the sharp increase in the stability of GDP growth since 1991. Before this, growth accelerated episodically, was punctuated by large annual variations, and often failed to sustain. Thus, growth has not just accelerated post liberalisation, it has also become more stable.

Third, growth has been broadly diversified. Growth has accelerated the fastest in services, followed by industry, and less so in agriculture. Over the long run, India’s growth has been driven by an increasing share of investment and exports, with a large contribution from consumption. Growth has also been characterized by productivity gains – both in labor productivity as well as in total factor productivity.

Finally, growth has been broadly resilient to shocks, both domestic and external. The resilience of India’s growth can be attributed to the country’s large and spatially diversified economy, as well as to its diversified production structure that is not dependent on a few products, commodities, or natural resources. It can also be attributed to India’s diversified trade basket and broad range of trading partners, wherein a slowdown in any one part of the world will not result in a large impact on India.



The resilience of India’s growth process was on display in recent years when the country recovered quickly from the impacts of two major policy events – demonetization and the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), an important indirect tax reform. We argue that the deceleration to growth rates below 7 percent between Q3 2016–17 and Q2 2017–18 was an aberration, attributed to temporary disruptions in economic activity as the economy adjusted to demonetization and businesses prepared for the implementation of GST. At present, there are indications that the economy has bottomed out and, in the coming quarters, economic activity should revert to the trend growth rate of about 7.5 percent. We project GDP growth to be 6.7 percent in 2017-18 and accelerate to 7.3 percent and 7.5 percent respectively in 2018-19 and 2019-20.

Why those promoting growth need to take politics seriously, and vice versa

Duncan Green's picture

Nicholas Waddell, a DFID Governance Adviser working on ‘Governance for Economic Development’ (G4ED) explores the links between governance and economic growth. 

Should I play it safe and join a governance team or risk being a lone voice in a sea of economists and private sector staff? This was my dilemma as a DFID Governance Adviser returning to the UK after a stint in East Africa. I gambled and joined the growth specialists in DFID’s newly created Economic Development arm.  A year in, I now think differently about the relationship between growth and governance.

Man working inside a large reinforced steel tube, PhilippinesEradicating poverty will not be possible without high and sustained growth that generates productive jobs and brings benefits across society. Historically, this has included boosting productivity within existing sectors as well as rebalancing economies towards more productive sectors (e.g. from agriculture to manufacturing). Such structural change or economic transformation has lifted millions from poverty.

Economic transformation can have a strong disruptive effect on political governance – giving rise, for example, to interest groups that push for accountable leaders and effective institutions. As countries get richer, more effective institutions also become more affordable. Over time, economic transformation can therefore advance core governance objectives.

But this is easier said than done. Economic development is an inherently political process that challenges vested interests. Often the surest ways for elites to hold onto power and profit aren’t in step with measures to spur investment, create jobs and foster growth. Shrewd power politics can be bad economics.

What you don't know can hurt you: Malaria edition

Markus Goldstein's picture
You are feeling not so well.   You go to the doctor.   She is a good doctor.   She runs some tests, tells you nothing is wrong with you and you leave, ready to get back to work.   Why are you so much more ready to work now then you were before you saw your doctor?  
 

Leveraging Nigeria’s Comparative Advantage

Volker Treichel's picture

With a view to assessing the practical implications of the Growth Identification and Facilitation framework (GIFF) (*for more on this, see the bottom of this post) in a concrete country case, Justin Yifu Lin and I are preparing a draft paper applying the framework to Nigeria. The paper (which is expected to be published shortly) identifies as appropriate comparator countries for Nigeria: China, Vietnam, India and Indonesia. The key sectors that are identified by the paper are TV receivers, motorcycles and motor vehicle parts, fertilizers, tires, vegetable oil, meat, meat products and poultry, leather, palm oil and rice, telecommunications, wholesale and retail and construction. Our key recommendation for Nigeria is to address power shortages in a targeted manner through Independent Power Plants located in industrial zones, as well as create other enabling conditions, e.g. through subsidized access to finance and promotion of research and development (agriculture). In the area of trade policy, the government could pre-commit to reducing tariffs over a period of years and at the same time to creating a set of enabling conditions that would obviate the need for tariff protection. That way, significant incentives would be in place for the private sector to lobby the relevant government agencies to keep up their commitment to addressing these constraints. Before finalizing the paper, I visited Nigeria to meet with a range of industries that had been identified by the paper as possible target sectors and better understanding their business prospects and constraints, as well as meet with senior government officials to gauge their reaction to the proposed framework.

Underutilization of capacity and Ricardian equivalence

Justin Yifu Lin's picture

In a recent blog post “Ricardian Confusions”, Paul Krugman commented on my paper “Beyond Keynesianism and the New New Normal” delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations on Feb. 28. He points out that the government’s fiscal stimulus generally is temporary and households will not increase savings by the full amount of the stimulus. As a result, the stimulus is expansionary even if Ricardian equivalence holds. His comment triggered a series of discussions (Antonio Fatas and Ilian Mihov, Mark Thoma, Paul Krugman, Nick Rowe, and Brad Delong).  
 
I have no disagreement with Paul about the possibility of an expansionary effect of a temporary fiscal stimulus. But if the effect exists and the stimulus does not increase productivity as in his example, there will also be a contractionary effect after the exit of stimulus and the increase of tax to retire the public debts. At the end the issue of underutilization of capacity, which my paper attempts to address, will still be there.