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PPPs

One question, eight experts, part four: Richard Abadie

Richard Abadie's picture
Photo: Wikimedia Commons

To gain a better understanding of how innovation in public-private partnerships (PPPs) builds on genuine learning, we reached out to PPP infrastructure experts around the world, posing the same question to each. Their honest answers redefine what works — and provide new insights into the PPP process. This is the question we posed: How can mistakes be absorbed into the learning process, and when can failure function as a step toward a PPP’s long-term success?

Our fourth response in this eight-part series comes from Richard Abadie, who leads the Capital Projects and Infrastructure Group at PwC

Having worked in the infrastructure sector for nearly 20 years, I’ve had time to reflect on what success and failure look like in infrastructure PPPs. Mistakes have been, do, and will continue to be made when using PPPs. It is not perfect — nor is its application — but what in life is?

There are so many horror stories around non-PPP construction cost overruns, delays in completion, poorly specified contracts, weak tender management, corruption, failure to run transparent competitive processes, lack of project readiness, significant post-contract variations, and sporadic asset maintenance and management. PPPs eliminate many of the above structural weaknesses, which rightfully earns it its place as a challenging but effective procurement approach.

The chief criticisms of PPP — that it takes longer to procure and is less flexible than conventional procurement — have some validity. Getting price certainty does take time and requires clear contractual risk allocation through the life of the contract.

Protecting Your PPP: Stabilizing partnerships in uncertain times

Waleed Youssef's picture
Uncertainty is inherent in developing and operating complex infrastructure and services projects, and it is for this very reason that government officials seek public-private partnership (PPP) partners to mitigate the most complex of risks. Yet legal and regulatory frameworks, in place for legitimate reasons (especially in emerging markets), often dampen the private sector’s ability to address in an optimal manner the challenges that can and often do arise during the term of a concession.

It is important to distinguish between projects that exceed expectations — and therefore generate greater than expected financial returns to both parties, yet require additional, unanticipated capital investments — and struggling projects where there is an urge by the developer to reduce ongoing investment and maintenance.
 
Istanbul Ataturk Airport. 
Photo: Wikimedia Commons

“Successful PPPs are all alike…”
To paraphrase Tolstoy, successful PPPs are all alike, but every unsuccessful PPP is unsuccessful in its own way.

Successful projects are easier to manage owing to positive cash flows, and could additionally incorporate an obligation by the developer to increase its investment according to certain capacity-related triggers on the basis of floor and ceiling for project returns. This could also be supplemented by sponsor commitments to co-investment or to extend the concession terms based on minimum returns, as well as a sponsor sinking fund to ensure independence from the uncertain and tedious public budgeting process. Very often, concession agreements focus on what to do when things go wrong, but not how to continue to meet demand when things go well, especially toward the end of the concession term.

One question, eight experts, part three: David Bloomgarden

David Bloomgarden's picture

To gain a better understanding of how innovation in public-private partnerships (PPPs) builds on genuine learning, we reached out to PPP infrastructure experts around the world, posing the same question to each. Their honest answers redefine what works — and provide new insights into the PPP process. This is the question we posed: How can mistakes be absorbed into the learning process, and when can failure function as a step toward a PPP’s long-term success?

Photo: Wikimedia Commons

Our third response in this eight-part series comes from David Bloomgarden, Chief of the Basic Services and Green Growth unit of the Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank.

U.S. General George S. Patton famously said, “Take calculated risks. That is quite different from being rash.” This quote summarizes how countries should absorb risks into the learning process of a public-private partnership program.

Governments know that complex projects never go exactly as planned. PPPs are among the most complex of all infrastructure projects, because they involve multiple stakeholders in the public and private sectors and tend to be used to procure large infrastructure. Starting a new PPP program requires that governments learn to master the regulatory, institutional and technical challenges involved in planning, designing and implementing a PPP.

Few governments — and especially those of developing economies — can afford failure in the delivery of critical infrastructure and services given the scarce resources and enormous human needs.

And the gold medal for PPP goes to…Galeão International Airport’s record-setting deal

Isabel Marques de Sá's picture
When the Olympic Games comes to Rio in 2016, new medal-worthy sports will include kitesurfing, golf, and rugby sevens. If the Olympic Committee ever considers including our “sport” – the practice of public-private partnerships (PPPs) – the top medal would surely go to the home-grown Galeão International Airport PPP, which set the 2014 record as the largest PPP deal that closed globally. For this gateway to Rio – which is in the midst of preparing to accommodate more than 10,000 athletes and tens of thousands more visitors for the 2016 Olympics – even the concessions merit global rankings.
 
Image: Wikimedia Commons

Standing by for liftoff
The concession of Galeao International Airport (official name: Rio de Janeiro/Galeão–Antonio Carlos Jobim International Airport) got off the ground in the second round of airport concessions. The first round dates back to early 2012, when the government issued tenders for three major airports: Guarulhos (São Paulo), Viracopos (Campinas) and Brasília.  

In mid-2012, following the successful outcome of these three projects, the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) approached IFC to assist with a second round of airport concessions, including Confins airport (Belo Horizonte) and Galeão (Rio de Janeiro).  IFC teamed up with the Estruturadora Brasileira de Projetos (EBP), a project preparation company owned by some of the biggest Brazilian commercial banks and BNDES. Together, IFC and EBP were responsible for the financial, technical/economic/engineering, and environmental studies. 

One question, eight experts, part two: Fernando Crespo Diu

Fernando Crespo Diu's picture

To gain a better understanding of how innovation in public-private partnerships (PPPs) builds on genuine learning, we reached out to PPP infrastructure experts around the world, posing the same question to each. Their honest answers redefine what works — and provide new insights into the PPP process. This is the question we posed: How can mistakes be absorbed into the learning process, and when can failure function as a step toward a PPP’s long-term success?

Our second response in this eight-part series comes from Fernando Crespo Diu, Director of UTAP, the Portuguese PPP unit.

Although not a desirable outcome, failure is always the first step of the learning process toward more successful projects, in terms of implementation, value for money, and financial and fiscal sustainability. There is an enabling prerequisite for the learning process, particularly given the complexity and long duration of PPP arrangements: the establishment of institutional arrangements that provide stable, professional and fully dedicated teams of experts within the structures of the public sector.

A central PPP unit — ideally located in the Ministry of Finance — should participate in all stages of a project lifecycle, from structuring to contract management, allowing continuous feedback and dialogue between contract management and public teams. In such an environment, the role of external advisors has to be carefully planned, as they provide key skills along the project lifecycle, but must not substitute those tasks where knowledge must be developed, stored and used by the public sector.

Clearing the air: the 5 most common questions about national park PPPs

Warren Meyer's picture
Big Pine Creek Recreation Area, Inyo National Forest, California. Photo: Itoda.com

If the thought of summer conjures up visions of national parks, you’re not alone – in 2014, nearly 3 million tourists visited forests, mountains, trails, and rivers at U.S. national parks.

If you crossed the gate into one of these treasures, you probably didn’t care whether that particular forest or mountain fell under government or private ownership. But it’s worth noting, because national park concessions fill a vital role helping the National Park Service carry out its mission, and there are benefits to these partnerships that can keep the parks viable — and the visitors happy — for decades to come. 

There are also misconceptions about national park PPPs. To clear the air, I’ve answered some of the most common questions below.

Senegal shifts its thinking: Context is everything

Oumar Diallo's picture
Editor's note: this is the second in a two-part series. Click here to read the first part, "Senegal shifts its thinking: Rural water delivery moves to private operators."
 
Photo: flickr/Julien Harnels

In the rural water sector in Senegal, as with many parts of the world that have experienced tremendous changes, context is everything. Rarely does one single act spur a shift at the government level; many elements combine to prompt a change in approach.

The PPP team in Senegal was privileged to be able to develop a brand-new system for rural water delivery in Senegal (see previous post here), but our activity was just one contributing factor in a much larger national and even international effort. The political context in Senegal, along with sustained attention to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), created the right atmosphere for this PPP.   
 
Here are five important elements that came together to make Senegal’s paradigm-shifting PPP possible:
  1. Government officials’ forward-thinking views. Coming up with an original plan for the delivery of rural water depended on zoning changes. Our group’s internal study showed that dividing the country into three zones would make it possible to cluster services. Government’s willingness to consider clustering pipe systems across 14 regions was critical, because it made support from the private sector a viable option.

One question, eight experts, part one: Isabel Rial

Isabel Rial's picture

Some public-private partnerships (PPPs) fail. That’s a fact. But when the lessons these failures impart are integrated into future projects, missteps have the potential to innovate — energizing the learning cycle and setting the stage for long-term success. To gain a better understanding of how innovation in PPPs builds on genuine learning, we reached out to PPP infrastructure experts around the world, posing the same question to each. Their honest answers redefine what works — and provide new insights into the PPP process.

This is the question we posed: How can mistakes be absorbed into the learning process, and when can failure function as a step toward a PPP’s long-term success?

Our first response in this eight-part series comes from the International Monetary Fund's Isabel Rial.

For centuries, PPPs have been used by governments as an alternative to traditional public procurement for the provision of public infrastructure, although results have been mixed. If properly managed, PPPs can deliver substantial benefits in terms of mobilizing private financial resources and know-how, promoting efficient use of public funds and improving service quality.

Yet in practice, PPPs have not always performed better than traditional public provision of infrastructure. The reasons for this vary across countries.

Good decisions, successful PPPs!

Marcos Siqueira's picture

When considering public-private partnerships (PPPs), the million- (or even billion-) dollar question is: What is the single most relevant factor that drives PPP projects to failure?

Photo: flickr/Milton Jung
As a governmental officer, managing PPP transactions for many years, and later as a consultant on the private side of transactions, I have led more than 40 PPP initiatives. Many succeeded and are delivering Value for Money for users and taxpayers. However, several others failed along the way, and contracts never got signed. What surprises me is that failure came even to some technically perfect projects.

Every successful PPP with which I’ve been involved shared one important factor: effective governance in the project level, from the identification of the project, all the way to the tender process.

By governance I mean the set of processes that allows decisions to be made by the right people, with access to the right information, at the right time, so the project can meet the requirements defined by the project’s stakeholders.

Senegal shifts its thinking: Rural water delivery moves to private operators

Oumar Diallo's picture
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Overnight success takes years, as the saying goes – and that’s certainly the case for the delivery of water to rural regions of Senegal. On July 2, 2015, the Government of Senegal celebrated the signing of its first lease (affermage) contract in the rural water sector, the result of a partnership that marks a significant and promising shift in rural water management for the country. This success in Senegal was years in the making, dating back about 15 years to the start of Senegal’s reform process.

Though Senegal’s situation is unique, insights and lessons from the project can inform and strengthen other rural water PPPs as well.
 
What changed, and why it matters 
In Senegal’s earlier period of reform, government officials looked to community-based management for 1,500 rural water piped systems to serve the 7.5 million people in need of water services across 14 rural regions. (Senegal is divided into three large geographic zones – North, South and Central – with ongoing transactions in smaller areas like Gorom Lampsar and Notto-Diosmone-Palmarin, known as GL-NDP, and the Senegal River region.) At that time, officials thought this would be the best way to eventually scale up management of the rural water system. By 2010, though, discussions between the World Bank Group and the Government of Senegal pushed reform forward by including more private sector management, which also aimed to increase sustainability of the system. 

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