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Catastrophe bonds: The international community can facilitate the development of innovative risk management tools

Sébastien Boreux's picture

The following post is a part of a series that discusses 'managing risk for development,' the theme of the World Bank’s upcoming World Development Report 2014.

One thing financial markets are good at is innovating and creating new instruments that meet the ever-evolving needs of investors and economic agents  managing their risks (such as national or subnational governments). In the mid-1990s, after hurricane Andrew and the Northridge earthquake in the United States, it became increasingly clear that some risks were too big to insure with existing instruments. This matters most to governments and insurers who have to pick up the pieces after a natural disaster as the frequency and cost of natural hazards have been increasing over the past few decades.

In the aftermath of a natural disaster, governments have to shift budgetary resources away from new investments for development to relief and reconstruction efforts. For insurance companies, catastrophic events can put pressure on their financial viability. One way to relieve the pressure is to transfer such risks to capital markets. That is how catastrophe bonds (cat-bonds) were born, as financial instruments to further disperse the risk of natural disasters more broadly and use the risk-taking capacity of institutional investors worldwide. 

Why energy poverty may differ from income poverty

Shahid Khandker's picture

There is a continuing controversy over what constitutes energy poverty and whether it is synonymous with income poverty or lack of access to electricity.  Several approaches are used to define and measure energy poverty, taking into account both demand and supply of alternative energy sources, including biomass, LPG, and electricity.  But as yet, no consensus has emerged for measuring and monitoring energy poverty and explaining why and how it differs from income poverty.

Like income poverty, energy poverty may be defined by the minimum energy consumption needed to sustain lives.  But unlike income poverty—based on the concept of a poverty line defined by the minimum consumption of food and non-food items necessary to sustain a livelihood—energy poverty lacks a well-established energy poverty line to determine the minimum amount of energy needed for living.  Current indicators used by such organizations as the World Bank and the International Energy Agency (IEA) measure energy poverty indicators as outputs (e.g., lack of electricity connections) rather than outcomes (e.g., electricity consumption and associated welfare gains).

Scenarios are not merely uncertain forecasts

Hans Timmer's picture

My previous blog ended with a question about the usefulness of anticipating the long-term future if that future is highly uncertain. Ever since the 1982 article on “Trends and random walks in macroeconomic time series” by Nelson and Plosser, there has been a debate about the long-term statistical properties of GDP and other macroeconomic variables. Nelson and Plosser could not reject the hypothesis of a random walk (with drift), which means that random shocks have a permanent impact on the level of GDP and that the uncertainty interval around forecasts becomes wider and wider with every year you try to peek farther into the future. The message seems to be: If next year’s world is already very uncertain, don’t even bother forecasting the world in 2030.

Others found that “macroeconomic time series are best construed as stationary fluctuations around a deterministic trend function”, if you allow for a few structural breaks in the trend. The consequences for long-term forecasting are huge because, in this case, random shocks are transitory, there is mean reversion, and it is in fact easier to analyze long-term trends than short-term fluctuations.

Help Us Help You: Sharing the Responsibility for Managing Risk

Martin Melecky's picture

The following post is a part of a series that discusses 'managing risk for development,' the theme of the World Bank’s upcoming World Development Report 2014.To know more and share your feedback click here.

Who should be responsible for managing risk?
Sometimes those given the responsibility have the least capacity. People are generally capable of dealing with certain small risks. But they are inherently ill equipped to confront large idiosyncratic risks (household head falling ill), systemic risks that affect many people at the same time (natural disasters), or multiple risks occurring either simultaneously or sequentially (low harvest due to droughts followed by food insecurity due to a food price increase).  To manage these different types of risks, people need support from other socioeconomic systems.

If the responsibility needs to be shared, who should share it?
Too often the first response to shared responsibility is to turn to the government for support. Government support, however, could require additional resources, possibly through increased taxes to ensure fiscal sustainability. Increased taxes could be burdensome for the economy and leave fewer resources for self-reliance (self-protection and self-insurance), which could be the most effective actions to manage some risks.

Moreover, government support can distort incentives, causing those affected by risk to take less responsibility for managing it (a situation known as moral hazard). For instance, some U.S. homeowners in disaster-prone areas do not buy disaster insurance knowing they can count on government aid if their home is destroyed.  Hence approaches to sharing responsibility must ensure that risk takers or those exposed to risk retain some “skin in the game.”

Friday Roundup – Inequality, Biofuel Prices, Exchange Rates and Keynes vs Austerity

LTD Editors's picture

Three new Policy Research Working papers, a Project Syndicate piece by Ken Rogoff, and an Eduardo Porter column in the New York Times, titled ‘A Keynesian Victory, but Austerity Stands Firm,’ made for an interesting week.

A working paper published this week by Milanovic Branko uses multiple techniques to gauge how close measured inequality is to the maximum inequality that can exist in a given society.  Looking at historical data tracing back several centuries, Branko finds that inequality in colonies was pushed almost to its maximum. Branko also looks beyond inequality as measured by income inequality to inequality in social terms.

Harry de Gorter, Dusan Drabik and Govinda Timilsina have a working paper on the relationship between volatility in crude oil prices, biodiesel and oilseeds (soy beans and canola).  They find that higher crude oil prices increase biodiesel prices if biofuels benefit from a fuel tax exemption, but lower them when a blending mandate is imposed.  When both canola and soybeans are used to produce biodiesel, an increase in the crude oil prices lead to higher canola prices, but the effect on soybean prices is ambiguous.

A Paean to Reason and Empathy

Kaushik Basu's picture

The following blog post is an excerpt from my commencement address delivered at the Diploma Ceremony of Fordham University, held in New York on May 19, 2013

The first rule of reason is honesty. There are situations in life where kindness and concern for others make us hold back on certain kinds of speech. That is as it should be. Speech can hurt as much as physical violence. If the latter is wrong, so must be the former. But to ourselves, in our minds, we should practice the utmost honesty. Honesty in thought may be inconvenient but in the long-run it helps.

Consider what we are often told—that if there is a will, there is a way; with sufficient determination, we can achieve anything. But to believe in this you have to suspend reason. And my advice is don’t. There are things in life which through sufficient determination you can achieve; but there are also things which no matter how hard you try, you will never get. It is best to see this clearly and realistically and then make your own choices rationally. You will make better decisions.

Financial Inclusion in Europe and Central Asia

Douglas Randall's picture

The countries of Europe and Central Asia have made undeniable, if uneven, progress in expanding financial inclusion in recent years. The well-developed microfinance industry and relatively widespread use of wage accounts in some countries are signs of success, though low savings rates and high levels of mistrust in the formal financial sector signal that much work remains to be done. The exclusion from the formal financial system of more than 175 million adults—disproportionately located in Central Asia—presents particularly difficult challenge for policy makers in the region. Our recently published Findex note takes an in-depth look at financial inclusion in the ECA region.

After 25,000 interviews in 23 ECA economies, a subset of the larger Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex) database , we now know that 45 percent of adults in that region have an account at a formal financial institution. This is on par with the rest of the developing world. But of course we know that there is more to financial inclusion than account ownership, it is equally important to have data on how accounts – and other basic financial tools - are used. Account holders in ECA are much more likely to use their account to receive wages or government payments, as compared to account holders in the rest of the developing world (77 percent vs. 41 percent). This is an interesting insight as to what mechanisms are already working to engage adults with formal financial systems, and something to keep in mind when we think about how to move forward.

Seizing Opportunities under Extreme Risks: Fragile and Conflict-Affected States

Inci Otker-Robe's picture

Fragile and conflict-affected countries confront some of the most extreme risks and constraints to their management that, if unaddressed, could create a vicious cycle of poverty, fragility, and conflict with far-reaching implications beyond these states. A well-balanced and collective approach to risk and opportunity can build on the progress made toward better development results going forward.

One thing that fragile and conflict-affected states (FCSs) have in abundance is the extreme risks facing their people. In these environments, consequences of risks materializing are often a matter of life and death. People living in such states make up only 15 percent of the world population, but represent nearly one-third of all people in extreme poverty, one-third of the HIV-related deaths in poor countries, one-third of people lacking access to clean water, one-third of children who do not complete primary education, and half of children dying before reaching their fifth birthday. Only eight of the 36 FCSs have so far met the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving extreme poverty, according to a new World Bank analysis, and the upward trend in the number of poor in FCSs (figure) is expected to take their share in the global poor population to 50 percent by 2015, according to an OECD report. The majority of MDGs in fragile states will not be met by 2015.

The incidence of extreme risks in FCSs is matched by the prevalence of severe constraints on the ability of people to manage risk. Characterized typically by high levels of corruption, weak governance and institutional capacity, an unfavourable environment for doing business and low competitiveness (figure), these states offer limited access to functioning market mechanisms, communities, or governments that provide an enabling environment for managing risk. Three quarters of the limited foreign investment in fragile states go to only seven (resource-rich) states.

In the long run, we all want to be alive, and thrive

Hans Timmer's picture

Ninety years ago, in his A Tract on Monetary Reform Keynes famously wrote “In the long run we are all dead”. That observation recently stirred a lot of debate for all the wrong reasons, after Niall Ferguson obnoxiously claimed that Keynes did not care about the future because he was childless. Whether Keynes cared about the long-term future or not (and whether he had children or not) is completely irrelevant in this context, as many (e.g. Brad DeLong and Paul Krugman) have pointed out.

The actual context in which Keynes wrote this observation was a discussion about the quantity theory of money, which states that doubling the supply of money will only double the prices, but will have no consequences for other parts of the economy. This is the classical dichotomy between real and nominal variables. Keynes argued: “Now in the long run this is probably true”. But “In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again.”  So, Keynes’ point was obviously not that the future doesn’t matter. His point was that simple theories that might describe long-term relationships are just not good enough to deal with current issues. In the short run, changes in money supply can have all kinds of important consequences beyond the price levels. Economists will have to make their hands dirty and delve into the complicated dynamics of the here and now.

Microcredit Borrowers in Bangladesh Are Not Necessarily Trapped in Poverty and Debt as many contended in recent years

Shahid Khandker's picture

With spectacular growth of microfinance institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh, there is a growing concern that borrowers might be borrowing from multiple sources and more than they are able to repay, and hence, they are trapped in poverty and debt.  Microfinance programs, operating in Bangladesh for more than two decades, have reached more than 10 million households in 2008, nearly half the rural population, with an annual disbursement close to US$1.8 billion and an outstanding balance of US$1.5 billion.  Multiple program membership has increased over the years: it was nonexistent in 1991/92, 11.9 percent in 1998/99 and 36 percent in 2010/11. 

However, a recent study shows that increased borrowing, even from multiple sources, has not lowered loan recovery rates. 

Also, another recent study observes that microcredit borrowers are not necessarily trapped in poverty and debt. This study analyzes data from a long panel survey over a 20-year period, and finds that although many participants have been with microcredit programs for many years they are not necessarily trapped in debt as the accrued assets due to borrowing outweigh accumulated debt for many borrowers.

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