Syndicate content

Should the World Bank issue credit ratings?

Marek Hanusch's picture
In any country, election year is a time when incumbents and hopefuls steeped in the rough and tumble of vote-getting are in urgent need of sporting some successes. Economists often talk of ‘political budget cycles,’  where governments borrow to temporarily gain votes. Needless to say, expenditure stemming from this type of borrowing, more commonly known as ‘pork’, is typically inefficient.  In a recent paper, we demonstrate that governments are less likely to borrow in election years if and when major credit rating agencies put them on ‘watch’.

Our findings stem from analyses of credit ratings and government borrowing in 63 developing and developed countries between 2002 and 2011 (building on an earlier paper). We argue that credit ratings discipline fiscal policy in two ways. First, as is well known, credit ratings affect the cost of borrowing. Governments are loath to be downgraded because it will increase the cost of financing new projects or rolling over existing public debt. Second, credit rating downgrades have a signaling character. They are reported widely in the media.

In our sample, rating downgrades in election years are rare. Yet, when they do occur, incumbent governments are 27 percentage points more likely to lose the election. This effect is independent of the actual size of the fiscal deficit or public debt. Credit raters thus do something of a public service for citizens, although perhaps inadvertently: Credit ratings are easily understood expert opinions on a country’s fiscal policy stance—expressed in letter grades. A rating downgrade suggests that a country is less capable of servicing its financial obligations. This is a powerful verdict on the government’s competence.  And when that verdict is rendered in an election year, citizens may well use it as a basis for voting the incumbent government out of office.

Before credit rating agencies change their assessment of national solvency conditions, they often provide a public warning by giving the rating a positive or negative watch or outlook. We demonstrate that governments with ratings having a negative outlook are less likely to borrow in election years than those that have stable or positive outlooks. We propose that this is due to governments’ fear of facing higher borrowing costs or having their reputation of economic competence tarnished by an actual downgrade, especially in election years. Our findings are especially strong in poorer countries with weaker credit ratings. Those countries also tend to have more pronounced ‘political budget cycles.’ Our research suggests that these countries may gain particularly from credit ratings, strengthening fiscal responsibility—which in turn creates an enabling environment for reducing poverty and boosting shared prosperity.

However, the reputation of the major for-profit credit agencies has been deeply tarnished following the global financial crisis, wherein they allegedly played a role in the subprime mortgage crisis. Therefore, we believe a strong case can be made for non-profit credit rating agencies. If credit ratings share characteristics of a public good, public institutions may be particularly suited to issuing them. Against this backdrop, the Bertelsmann Foundation recently proposed to set up a non-profit credit rating agency (Incra).
 
The International Financial Institutions in Washington, the World Bank and the IMF, both already analyze their member countries’ debt sustainability. Turning these assessment into easily understood letter-grade credit ratings—comparable to the AAA & co. ratings we are so familiar with—would not be a big leap.
 
So, we’re proposing an alternative: what if  the World Bank issued credit ratings for government bonds? Perhaps a novel idea, but one worth considering.

Comments

Submitted by Juan on

Very interesting blog Marek!

Great to see the link being made between financial sector products and macro-fiscal (good precedent for the new EFI combination at the Bank).

Perhaps we can look at public debt issuance to private investors as playing the same catalytic role as PPP investors, especially if Governments know that the true cost will be borne at the polls.

With regards to the role of the Bank as a provider of ratings relative to the private rating agencies (with their recognized conflicts of interest), perhaps the private sector has more effect as voters know that the private sector downgrade will result in more expensive borrowing (and a predictor of cost to tax payers), while the Bank will always continue to lend on the same terms?

Thanks, Juan, for this very insightful comment. It is indeed hard to see how established credit rating agencies would not play a primary role.  They are better known and their rating and rating-watch scheme more easily understood, at least in the near term. However, the Bank and Fund do have ample experience in assessing the sustainability of national debt, and channelling this into easily understood ratings would convey information on the quality of debt in the same way as the commercial credit raters do. After all, investors and voters care about the accuracy of the underlying risk of default, independently of who provides this information. The fact that the Bank (and Fund) are public entities reduces the conflict of interest you refer to, thus adding value to the current commercial rating system.

All the best,
Marek

Submitted by Neil Walmsley C40 on

Hi Marek,
An interesting idea! Would this concept apply to sub-sovereign entities, e.g. cities? I am currently working with your colleagues at the Bank to help several megacities in Asia and Africa achieve an investment grade rating from for-profit agencies, but the challenges facing these cities can be immense. The World Bank has a much greater understanding of these cities than international agencies, so it would seem logical the Bank would be in a better position to assess a city's creditworthiness?

Neil, we think your comment is spot on.  When Paul presents this research to local academic colleagues and policy makers at the University of Minnesota, one of the illustrative anecdotes he uses relates to mayoral politics in Minneapolis and the adverse electoral impact of credit rating downgrades in election periods for incumbents. Currently the Bank focusses on assessing sovereign debt although with our increasing work with sub-nationals in some countries one could think about extending potential 'credit ratings' by the Bank to other debt-issuing public entities, such as the cities you mention. We would be happy to link up on this. Thanks again for your comment and good luck with the interesting work you are doing!

All the best,
Marek

Add new comment