Thanks for the comment, SJ. These are indeed very interesting figures. One quick lesson I draw from this at a general level (I am not sure if it applies to Plan Ceibal) is that, where widespread use of technology use is meant to be truly transformational at a large scale within existing structures, many other costs may need to be incurred if the initiative is to be 'successful'. If that is the case, as large scale initiatives move from just educational technology initiatives to something more systemic, we may need to adjust the lens through which they are viewed, and the metrics against which they are measured. When things are done at a small scale, or even perhaps at a 'medium' scale, certain inefficiencies in the system are still bearable (for lack of a better term). Once you think and act at a very large scale within existing structures, you may need to address certain fundamental or core inefficiences to 'succeed', and this may cost more money. Whether this is what is happening in Uruguay or not, I don't know, but this would be worth exploring. (As the folks in Maine have found out, once you squeeze the tube forcefully enough in one place, you may be forced to clean up a mess somewhere else, even if the mess isn't really your 'fault', before you can get on with your business. Not the best analogy, perhaps, but you probably get my general point.) Calculating TCO is notoriously tricky; at various stages of implementation, costs that originally resided on the balance sheet of one initiative may rightly be seen to be better placed on the balance sheet of another initiative. That said, given how incomplete our understanding of cost issues with these sorts of initiatives is, it is great to see more transparency on these sorts of things. Where and how we assign costs is a largely theoretical exercise in the absence of any reliable data; it is great to see that some more data is emerging from the Uruguayan experience to help inform our understanding and challenge our assumptions about all of this stuff.