On the one hand, the Public Sector practice is increasingly arguing that “politics matters” both for de jure reforms and de facto implementation to impact development outcomes; on the other, the projects and programs on which actual monies and human resources are expended focus on technocratic capacity building, and on de jure design of institutions of public sector management. The intellectual leadership on why and how “politics matters” to which the practice seems to subscribe most prominently is that of North et al on “limited access orders”, which suggests that technocratic changes introduced externally upon a polity which has its own internal “logic” of political rent-seeking are unlikely to make a difference. I quote (from page 43-44 of North et al, July 2007): “…the dominant coalition in a LAO can adopt the institutional forms proposed by an international donor without fundamentally changing the way the receiving society operates. Since institutional forms and mechanisms operated differently in different societies, recipient countries may be able to adopt the recommended institutional forms and co-opt those forms to sustain or strengthen their LAOs….We need to appreciate more deeply the logic and power of the LAO by which elites have incentives to subvert these reforms or, as they would see it, to adapt the institutional reforms to local conditions.” Indeed, any/most political economy theories would reach the same conclusion. How is the new, updated, PSM strategy addressing such (very difficult) concerns?