Resources
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Publication category: Governance and Human Rights
Author(s): Jonathan Isham, Daniel Kaufmann and Lant Pritchett
Publisher: World Bank Economic Review
Date: May, 1997
Description:
Excerpt from SSRN: This article uses a cross-national data set on the performance of government investment projects financed by the World Bank to examine the link between government efficacy and governance. It demonstrates a strong empirical link between civil liberties and the performance of government projects. Even after controlling for other determinants of performance, countries with the strongest civil liberties have projects with an economic rate of return 8-22 percentage points higher than countries with the weakest civil liberties. The strong effect of civil liberties holds true even when controlling for the level of democracy. The interrelationship among civil liberties, civil strife, and project performance suggests that the possible mechanism of causation is from more civil liberties to increased citizen voice to better projects. This result adds to the evidence for the view that increasing citizen voice and public accountability - through both participation and better governance - can lead to greater efficacy in government action. -
Publication category:
Author(s): Daniel Kaufmann
Publisher: e-Journal USA
Date: June, 2008
Description:
Short paper that touches on the debate about whether economic development is possible without democracy. Although there is an assumed convential wisdom that democracy is a precondition for economic growth, Daniel Kaufmann argues that there is ambiguous empirical evidence about the causal relation between democracy and development. Rejecting the extremes of this relation, the author proposes that a better approach to understand the links between development and democracy should include: (i)a long-term analysis as opposed to the short-term perspective of previous research, and (ii) a focus on a broader concept of democracy that includes freedom of expression, voice and accountability, and that is not limited to elections. -
Publication category: Governance and Growth
Author(s): Reflections by Douglass North, Daron Acemoglu, Francis Fukuyama, and Dani Rodrik.
Publisher: The World Bank
Date: April, 2008
Description:
Short publication prepared for the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) Conference 2008. The distinguished and recognized scholars reflect about to gap between today's conventional idea that institutions matter for development and the still unclear guidance of what aspects of governance are good entry points for policymakers and practitioners, given the diverse circumstances that they face in developing countries. The scholars provide different frameworks to address this issue, and generally agree that "one-size-fits-all" and "best practice" approaches are not the best entry point for a good governance agenda. -
Publication category: Governance indicators
Author(s): Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi
Publisher: World Bank
Date: June 24, 2008
Description:
Abstract excerpt from SSRN: This paper reports on the latest update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research project, covering 212 countries and territories and measuring six dimensions of governance between 1996 and 2007: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The latest aggregate indicators are based on hundreds of specific and disaggregated individual variables measuring various dimensions of governance, taken from 35 data sources provided by 32 different organizations. The data reflect the views on governance of public sector, private sector and NGO experts, as well as thousands of citizen and firm survey respondents worldwide. We also explicitly report the margins of error accompanying each country estimate. These reflect the inherent difficulties in measuring governance using any kind of data. We also briefly describe the evolution of the WGI since its inception, and show that the margins of error on the aggregate governance indicators have declined over the years, even though they still remain non-trivial. We find that even after taking margins of error into account, the WGI permit meaningful cross-country comparisons as well as monitoring progress over time. In less than a decade, a substantial number of countries exhibit statistically significant improvements in at least one dimension of governance, while other countries exhibit deterioration in some dimensions. -
Publication category: Political economy
Author(s): Philip Keefer
Publisher: World Bank
Date: May 2005
Description:
Excerpt from SSRN: "This paper identifies and explains systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality and lower secondary school enrollment; and spend more on public investment and government workers. One explanation for this is that politicians in young democracies are less credible. Keefer and Vlaicu (2004) argue that the inability of political competitors to make credible promises to citizens leads them to underprovide public goods, overprovide transfers to narrow groups of voters, and engage in excessive rent-seeking. A variety of tests suggest that this is the only theory that explains the performance of young democracies. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies." -
Publication category: Governance and Growth
Author(s): Stanley Engerman and Kenneth Sokoloff
Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
Date: 2005
Description:
Excerpt from SSRN: "Over the last few years, colonialism, especially as pursued by Europeans, has enjoyed a revival in interest among both scholars and the general public. Although a number of new accounts cast colonial empires in a more favorable light than has generally been customary, others contend that colonial powers often leveraged their imbalance in power to impose institutional arrangements on the colonies that were adverse to long-term development. We argue here, however, that one of the most fundamental impacts of European colonization may have been in altering the composition of the populations in the areas colonized. The efforts of the Europeans often involved implanting ongoing communities who were greatly advantaged over natives in terms of human capital and legal status. Because the paths of institutional development were sensitive to the incidence of extreme inequality which resulted, their activity had long lingering effects. More study is needed to identify all of the mechanisms at work, but the evidence from the colonies in the Americas suggests that it was those that began with extreme inequality and population heterogeneity that came to exhibit persistence over time in evolving institutions that restricted access to economic opportunities and generated lower rates of public investment in schools and other infrastructure considered conducive to growth. These patterns may help to explain why a great many societies with legacies as colonies with extreme inequality have suffered from poor development experiences." -
Publication category: Political economy
Author(s): Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro C. Vicente
Publisher:
Date: October 2005
Description:
Excerpt from SSRN: We challenge the conventional definition of corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain, making a distinction between legal and illegal forms of corruption, and paying more attention to corporate patterns of corruption (which also affect public corruption). We undertake to identify general determinants of the pattern of legal and illegal corruption worldwide, and present a model where both corruption (modeled explicitly in the context of allocations) and the political equilibrium are endogenous. Three types of equilibrium outcomes are identified as a function of basic parameters, namely initial conditions (assets/productivity), equality, and fundamental political accountability. These equilibria are: i) an illegal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite does not face binding incentives; ii) a legal corruption equilibrium, where the political elite is obliged to incur on a cost to deceive the population; and iii) a no-corruption equilibrium, where the population cannot be deceived. An integral empirical test of the model is performed, using a broad range of variables and sources. Its core variables, namely regarding legal corruption (and other manifestations of corporate corruption) come from an original survey developed with the World Economic Forum (in the Executive Opinion Survey 2004 of the Global Competitiveness Report). The empirical results generally validate the model and explanations. Some salient implications emerge. -
Publication category:
Author(s): Stephen Knack
Publisher: World Bank
Date: 2000
Description:
Do higher levels of aid erode the very quality of governance poor countries need for sustained and rapid income growth?Good governance-in the form of institutions that establish predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced rules for investors-is crucial for the sustained and rapid growth of per capita incomes in poor countries. Aid dependence can undermine institutional quality by weakening accountability, encouraging rent seeking and corruption, fomenting conflict over control of aid funds, siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions.
Knack's analyses of cross-country data provide evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic quality, corruption, and the rule of law. This negative relationship strengthens when instruments for aid are used to correct for potential reverse causality. It is robust to changes in the sample and to several alternative forms of estimation.
Recent studies have concluded that aid's impact on economic growth and infant mortality is conditional on policy and institutional gaps. Knack's results indicate that the size of the institutional gap itself increases with aid levels.
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Publication category:
Author(s): Paulo Mauro
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
Date: November 2002
Description:
Excerpt from SSRN: "There is increasing recognition that corruption has substantial, adverse effects on economic growth. But if the costs of corruption are so high, why don't countries strive to improve their institutions and root out corruption? Why do many countries appear to be stuck in a vicious circle of widespread corruption and low economic growth, often accompanied by ever-changing governments through revolutions and coups? A possible explanation is that when corruption is widespread, individuals do not have incentives to fight it even if everybody would be better off without it. Two models involving strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria attempt to illustrate this formally." -
Publication category: Governance Measurements
Author(s): Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay
Publisher: World Bank
Date: 2007
Description:
Scholars, policymakers, aid donors, and aid recipients
acknowledge the importance of good governance for
development. This understanding has spurred an intense
interest in more refined, nuanced, and policy-relevant
indicators of governance. In this paper we review progress
to date in the area of measuring governance, using
a simple framework of analysis focusing on two key
questions: (i) what do we measure? and, (ii) whose views
do we rely on? For the former question, we distinguish
between indicators measuring formal laws or rules 'on
the books', and indicators that measure the practical
application or outcomes of these rules 'on the ground',
calling attention to the strengths and weaknesses of
both types of indicators as well as the complementarities
between them. For the latter question, we distinguish
between experts and survey respondents on whose views
governance assessments are based, again highlighting
their advantages, disadvantages, and complementarities.
We also review the merits of aggregate as opposed to
individual governance indicators. We conclude with some
simple principles to guide the refinement of existing
governance indicators and the development of future
indicators. We emphasize the need to: transparently
disclose and account for the margins of error in all
indicators; draw from a diversity of indicators and exploit
complementarities among them; submit all indicators to
rigorous public and academic scrutiny; and, in light of
the lessons of over a decade of existing indicators, to be
realistic in the expectations of future indicators.

