Syndicate content

March 2010

Brazil Announces Phase Two of the Growth Acceleration Program

Ihssane Loudiyi's picture

(All credits go to SECOM for this information)


President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announces US$ 526 billion in public and private investments over 2011-2014

Yesterday, Brazil launched phase two of the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC 2), announcing estimated investments of US$ 526 billion (R$ 958.9 billion) for the period from 2011 to 2014. PAC 2 includes new investment projects for the periods 2011 to 2014 and post-2014, as well as projects initiated during PAC 1 with activities that will conclude after 2010. For the period following 2014, the estimated investment is US$ 346.4 billion (R$ 631.6 billion). The two periods combined reach an amount of US$ 872.3 billion (R$ 1.59 trillion).

PAC is a strategic investment program that combines management initiatives and public works. In its first phase, launched in 2007, the program called for investments of US$ 349 billion (R$ 638 billion), of which 63.3% has been applied.

Similar to the first phase of the program, PAC 2 focuses on investments in the areas of logistics, energy and social development, organized under six major initiatives: Better Cities (urban infrastructure); Bringing Citizenship to the Community (safety and social inclusion); My House, My Life (housing); Water and Light for All (sanitation and access to electricity); Energy (renewable energy, oil and gas); and Transportation (highways, railways, airports).

“I consider PAC 2 as a portfolio of projects that the next administration can build from rather than starting from scratch, as there is no time to lose,” said President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva during the announcement of the program.

PAC 2 Initiative in Detail...

Re-regulating the Financial Sector

Raj Nallari's picture

The financial system, measured by assets, profits, contribution to GDP, stock market capitalization, employment etc, has expanded rapidly since 1990. For example, global financial assets were about 50 trillion in 1989 and increased to about 200 trillion by 2007, during the same period financial depth increased from 200% of world GDP to 400% in 2007. The financial crisis has raised a plethora of issues, many of which are inter-twined. There have been failures on all fronts – market failures in the form of financial firms innovating new instruments while neglecting risk management practices, credit rating agencies failing in rating assets without much thought to risk, private auditors not checking Lehman Brothers’ assets and liabilities, government failures in the form of central bank keeping interest rates low in the run up to the crisis, and government entities such as Fannie and Freddie involved in mortgage lending and making enormous losses, and failure by regulators for not checking the books of financial firms such as Lehman Brothers that were moving toxic assets of the balance sheets, and last but least the financial economists who failed to foresee to crisis. There is plenty of blame to go around but one thing is clear: State ownership of financial firms is back. After decades of rising foreign ownership of banks (shrinking state ownership) in almost all regions, except the Middle East and South Asia, the trend could be reversed especially in the developed countries.

The crisis has shifted focus from foreign private ownership to some state ownership, from micro to macro prudential regulations, to re-assessment of deposit insurance, lender of last resort, and implicit guarantees, to consumer protection and taxpayer protection, from mark to market accounting to mark to funding, to revamping of credit rating agencies, to crisis in corporate governance and questioning of remuneration in financial firms, and to strengthening of supervision. These and a number of related issues of interest to policy makers are discussed below.

Given the large set of issues arising from the crisis, the major challenges facing countries are essentially two: (i) Government entities which are subsidizing directed credit (e.g. Frannie and Freddie in USA; similar type of ‘chaebol’ lending to industrial firms triggered the Asian crisis of 1997); and (ii) universality of too big to fail entities, where systemic important firms, often politically powerful conglomerates that are controlled by elites, have to be bailed out, which in turn leads to the moral hazard problem, where the large entity is considered worthy saving at all costs, including use of lender of last resort facilities from the Central Bank and tax payers money from the Treasury. The too big to fail entities also then knowingly max-out on leveraged lending (40 to one in case of USA) and ‘gamble’ on financially innovative instruments (e.g. mortgage-backed securities and credit default swaps in case of USA). The large entities also have the political clout to suppress regulations and/or evade regulations. Successful regulation requires that the regulator should have information on exposure to systemic risks. Too big to fail institutions were exposed to CD swaps (e.g. AIG in USA) and we knew little about its exposure. The reason is that there is data on a firm by firm but there is no agency that can put it all together. But policy makers and politicians are reluctant to address these two problems head on. Instead the focus on a large set of problems, as detailed below, and obfuscate the issues.

The Power of How

Ihssane Loudiyi's picture

What exactly do we mean by Capacity Development?

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (SNV Netherlands) redefine the concept through this creative new video. Enjoy!
 

Deadline TODAY: International Essay Competition 2010 on Youth Unemployment

Ihssane Loudiyi's picture

Hurry in and submit your entries for the 2010 International Essay Competition on the topic of "Youth Unemployment", organized by the World Bank and partners.

Finalists will be announced on April 30, 2010.

Winning essays from the 2009 Competition can be found here.

Re-visiting Exchange Rate Regimes

Raj Nallari's picture

The choice of exchange rate regimes by governments has evolved since the 1990s. In the early 1990s, as transition economies joined the world economy, they pegged to the Deutsche Mark, while the East Asian countries were pegged to the US dollar.

Is Fiscal Activism Back?

Raj Nallari's picture

I. Rethinking Fiscal Activism

The challenge of raising aggregate demand is now a global phenomenon. To get an understanding of the underlying processes, take the case of the US. Here, the fall in the stock market and owner occupied real estate led to an erosion of household wealth by over $10 trillion by June 2009. This led to an estimated decrease in aggregate demand by about $600 annually, or about 3% of GDP, due to a fall in household spending by about $400 billion and production by $200 billion. Automatic stabilizers like a decrease in personal and corporate taxes cushion the fall in aggregate demand by about a third, but still leaving a net GDP gap of about $400 billion annually1. So the present challenge in the US alone lies in policies that could potentially raise aggregate demand by about $400 billion annually.

In many advanced countries, including the United States, the scope of monetary policy to forcefully affect demand is limited to interest rates. However, interest rates in many of these countries are already at historically very low levels, leaving little leverage for further use of this instrument. In many emerging and developing economies, though central banks have lowered interest rates, they have done so cautiously so as to maintain incentives for capital inflows and external stability. Given the extent of the downturn and the limits to monetary policy action, fiscal policy is regarded as being crucial in providing short and medium term support to the global economy. However, while a fiscal response across many countries may be needed, not all countries have sufficient fiscal space to implement it since expansionary fiscal actions may threaten the sustainability of fiscal finances. This note discusses the possible fiscal policy goals, options and the potential long term impacts.

Re-thinking Macroeconomic Theory and Policy

Raj Nallari's picture

If you think the US financial system is broken, then you don’t know how much more broken the macroeconomic theory is. The traditional Keynesian model of ‘depression economics’ where increasing government spending could stimulate the economy was misused by governments, particularly in developing countries, for decades during the 1950s to the 1980s.