This is the eighth in this year’s series of posts by PhD students on the job market.
Condoms are the only well-established technology that protect against sexually transmitted infections (STIs). Yet in 2015 alone, an estimated 3.3 billion risky sex acts took place without condoms in Sub-Saharan Africa, leading to 910,000 new HIV infections (UNAIDS, 2016a). Women disproportionally bear the costs associated with risky sex: they are more vulnerable to HIV infection, and carry the burden of unwanted pregnancy (UNAIDS, 2016b). Yet despite women standing to benefit most from condom use, the decision to use a condom is joint, and both sexual partners must agree. Thus women with low bargaining power may struggle to convince their male partners to use condoms.
This is the eighth in this year’s series of posts by PhD students on the job market.
This is the seventh in this year’s job market series.
Developing countries regularly underperform in their capacity to collect taxes, with tax revenue to GDP ratios that are 20 to 30 percent less than those of high-income countries (Besley and Persson, 2014). This tax capacity gap represents lost revenue that could have provided much-needed public goods and services while reducing reliance on foreign aid. This issue is especially relevant in Africa, where “shadow economies” comprise up to 75% of national GDP (Schneider and Enste 2000), indicating that large swaths of these countries’ populations manage to evade taxation. What accounts for this failure to convince citizens to pay taxes?
Structural roadblocks to tax collections in developing countries include poor service quality, dysfunctional bureaucracies, and outdated equipment. In contrast, my job market paper provides a political explanation centered on clientelism, or politicians' exchange of targeted goods for votes from loyal supporters.
This is the sixth in this year’s job market series
Labor misallocation is believed to be a key driver of differences in income across countries (Hsieh and Klenow 2010). However, the causes of this misallocation are not always well understood and there is little evidence on what interventions can improve the allocation of workers in the economy. These issues are particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa, where worker mobility from low to high productivity sectors is often limited (McMillan, Rodrick and Verduzco-Gallo 2014).
My job market paper provides new experimental evidence from Ethiopia showing that subsidizing job applications can reduce inefficiencies in the allocation of workers’ talent.
This is the fifth in this year’s job market series.
By 2050, 2.5 billion people will move into cities with the vast majority doing so in the developing world (United Nations 2014). This has the potential to lift millions out of poverty by increasing the productivity of firms and workers who benefit from agglomeration. However, rapid and unplanned growth can lead to sprawling, inefficient cities with hours wasted stuck in traffic. Governments will spend vast sums on mass transit systems to reduce commute times (McKinsey 2016), but measuring their benefits is challenging. While individuals save time on any particular commute, their decisions of where to live and work will change as new alternatives become attractive and land and labor markets adjust. The lack of detailed intra-city data in less developed countries coinciding with the construction of large transit systems makes evaluating their causal impact even more daunting.
In my job market paper, I ask the question: how large are the economic gains to improving public transit within cities and how are they distributed between low- and high-skilled workers? I construct detailed data across 2,800 census tracts from before and after the opening of the world’s largest Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system–TransMilenio–in Bogotá, Colombia. I develop a new reduced form methodology derived from general equilibrium theory to empirically assess TransMilenio’s impact on city structure and use this framework to quantify its aggregate and distributional effects.
This is the fourth in this year’s series of job market posts.
As the quality of a country's public sector workforce is an essential factor in its effectiveness in providing services, governments should try to hire qualified individuals in the public sector (Finan et al. 2017). However, there may be an important obstacle to the quality of this recruitment process, especially in developing countries: politicians could engage in patronage - the use of public sector jobs to reward their political supporters.
Virtually all modern bureaucracies are characterized by a civil service system, where the introduction of meritocratic hiring criteria was meant to shield public sector jobs from patronage practices. However, politicians typically retain some discretion in the selection of public workers, for instance through the use of temporary contracts (Grindle 2012). As a consequence, patronage could still play an important role in public sector hiring. Despite the potentially significant impact of this phenomenon on the quality of the public workforce, no study has systematically documented its presence in a modern bureaucracy, limiting our understanding of its consequences for the public sector.
In my job market paper "Patronage in the Allocation of Public Sector Jobs" (joint work with Emanuele Colonnelli and Mounu Prem), I study patronage in the context of Brazilian local governments during the 1997-2014 period.
This is the third in this year’s series of posts by PhD students on the job market.
Globally, civil liberties and political rights have been declining for eleven consecutive years (Freedom House, 2017). The erosion of these measures runs counter to a priori expectations that circumstances would improve: the number of democracies had doubled within the past five decades and information is increasingly available to voters due to a growing and diverse set of media sources. The presence of more accessible information has been linked to improved political accountability, a fundamental factor of development (Drèze and Sen, 1989; Besley and Burgess, 2002). On the other hand, increased access to information is also believed to polarize voters, offering a possible explanation for the backsliding of democratic norms (Downs, 1957; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2011). In my job market paper, I show that experimentally varied exposure to the same information in a partisan campaign polarized vote choice on weakening the system of checks and balances in Turkey.
This is the second in this year’s series of posts by PhD students on the job market. Reminder that submissions close tomorrow at noon.
When I was in school, I used to skip some classes; my parents probably never learned about it (at least until this blog post). Now imagine there was a system in place to tell my parents how often I skipped classes in the previous weeks. When Nina’s parents get a message pointing out that she missed school yesterday, while they learn at no cost that her behavior was not in line with their expectations, they may also realize that attendance is an important dimension of their daughter’s behavior to which they should attend moving forward. Therefore, informing parents about their child’s attendance, for instance, might also draw their attention to the importance of attending class, increasing their awareness about monitoring benefits. This is particularly relevant in face of the evidence on how poverty captures attention (Mani et al., 2013), and on how, given limited attention, individuals may fail to learn from dimensions they do not notice (Hanna et al., 2014). Therefore, while informing parents lowers monitoring costs – alleviating moral hazard and inducing better school outcomes, in line with parent’s objectives –, communication may also increase the salience of monitoring benefits. My job market paper investigates the mechanisms behind the effects of communication with parents.
- job market papers 2017
This is the first in this year’s series of posts by PhD students on the job market. Reminder that submissions close this Wednesday at noon.
Good political institutions are thought to be essential for sustained economic development (Acemoglu et al., 2016). But where do inclusive, accountable institutions come from? One prominent explanation centers on taxation (Schumpeter, 1918; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2013). Historically, when states began systematically taxing their populations to pay for wars, citizens protested fiercely, demanding public goods and political rights: “no taxation without representation.” This process triggered the co-evolution of tax compliance, citizen participation in politics, and accountable governance. Today, policymakers often promote taxation in developing countries to jumpstart this same virtuous cycle. “Bringing small businesses into the tax net,” writes the IMF, “can help secure their participation in the political process and improve government accountability” (IMF, 2011).
- Trade Diversion lists trade-related job market papers. A final reminder to those who want to blog their job market paper for us – submissions close noon EST on Wed 22 November.
- Wired Magazine covers reproducibility in economics.
- The Stata blog has a series of videos on data management in Stata made easy
- Alix-Garcia and co-authors explain on VoxDev how refugee camps benefit host communities
- development impact links