We all know that institutions matter for development. A really nice new paper by Daron Acemoglu, Tristan Reed and James Robinson shows us how political competition affects a wide range of development outcomes.
Markus Goldstein's blog
co-authored with Michael O'Sullivan
As I procrastinate writing this post, it seems only fitting to take a look at a paper that takes a look at different commitment devices.
Two weeks ago, I blogged about some productive impacts of cash transfer programs. For these effects, as well as the myriad other blog posts and papers on this topic out there, a key point is that the benefits of these transfers extend well beyond the actual individual recipient of the transfer.
I just got back from two weeks visiting a bunch of ongoing projects in Africa. During the trip, the issue of community entry came up again.
I recently had a chance to read Rachel Glennester and Kudzai Takavarasha's (hereafter G&T) new book, Running Randomized Evaluations. It's got a lot to offer a bunch of different people.
I was at a workshop last week where I was moderating a discussion of the practicalities of doing impact evaluations in conflict and post-conflict settings. One of the program-implementation folks made clear that working with the impact evaluation was a strain -- as she put it this "was pulling our field staff through a keyhole". Which got me thinking about the costs that we, as impact evaluators, can cause for a program.
The old saw goes: when you have a hammer, everything looks like a nail. But what if the best way to fix your broken policy is actually a bolt? I was recently at a workshop where someone was presenting preliminary results of an evaluation cash transfer program which, while perhaps started with social protection kind of objectives in mind, actually seems to have had impacts on business creation and revenues that dwarfed your average business training program or microfinance program.