Did you miss this year’s Northeast Universities Development Consortium conference, or NEUDC? I did, unfortunately!
NEUDC is a large development economics conference, with more than 160 papers on the program, so it’s a nice way to get a sense of new research in the field.
Thankfully, since NEUDC posts submitted papers, I was able to mostly catch up. I went through 147 of the papers and summarized them below, by topic. If a paper you loved or presented isn’t in the rundown, feel free to add a brief summary in the comments. (Why 147 instead of 160? I skipped a few macro papers and the papers that weren’t posted.)
These links should take you to your topic of interest: Agriculture, cash transfers and asset transfers, credit and insurance, crime, conflict, violence, and war, culture, norms, and corruption, education, elections and political economy, firms, governance, bureaucracy, and social capital, health (including WASH), jobs (including public works), marriage, methodology, migration, mobile phones and mobile money, poverty, inequality, and shocks, psychology, taxes, and traffic.
This is the fourth in our series of posts by PhD students on the job market this year.
Giving livestock to poor households can increase their incomes substantially. This naturally raises the question: why were households not investing in such livestock before? One obvious answer is that they are poor – this means they can neither afford to invest themselves, nor get a loan from a bank (or microfinance organisation). But the puzzle is more subtle than that. When facing a crisis, even very poor households borrow informally, from a network of friends, family, and neighbours, to fund consumption. In addition, households in these networks collectively have the resources needed to invest in livestock. So the real question is: why don’t households pool resources to allow investment? What makes borrowing to invest so different from borrowing to smooth consumption?
This is the fifth in our series of job market posts this year.
Once known as the “Safe Haven” of Western Africa, because of its long-standing political stability and economic success, Côte d’Ivoire plunged in a decade-long vicious circle of political violence after a coup d’état in December 1999. The level and scope of violence reached its peak in September 2002 when a coalition of three rebel movements, known as the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (hereafter FNCI), occupied and tightened its grip over 60% of the country’s territory. Unlike other rebel movements in West African states such as Liberia and Sierra Leone, where territorial conquests were allegedly associated with “scorched-earth” and “denial-of-resource” tactics, the FNCI opted for an autonomous self-governance system.