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Jobs for Votes: RDD Evidence on Patronage in Brazilian Public Sector Hiring: Guest post by Edoardo Teso

This is the fourth in this year’s series of job market posts.
As the quality of a country's public sector workforce is an essential factor in its effectiveness in providing services, governments should try to hire qualified individuals in the public sector (Finan et al. 2017). However, there may be an important obstacle to the quality of this recruitment process, especially in developing countries: politicians could engage in patronage - the use of public sector jobs to reward their political supporters.

Virtually all modern bureaucracies are characterized by a civil service system, where the introduction of meritocratic hiring criteria was meant to shield public sector jobs from patronage practices. However, politicians typically retain some discretion in the selection of public workers, for instance through the use of temporary contracts (Grindle 2012). As a consequence, patronage could still play an important role in public sector hiring.  Despite the potentially significant impact of this phenomenon on the quality of the public workforce, no study has systematically documented its presence in a modern bureaucracy, limiting our understanding of its consequences for the public sector.

In my job market paper "Patronage in the Allocation of Public Sector Jobs" (joint work with Emanuele Colonnelli and Mounu Prem), I study patronage in the context of Brazilian local governments during the 1997-2014 period.

Teacher Coaching: What We Know

David Evans's picture
“Teacher coaching has emerged as a promising alternative to traditional models of professional development.” In Kraft, Blazar, and Hogan’s newly updated review “The Effect of Teacher Coaching on Instruction and Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of the Causal Evidence,” they highlight that reviews of the literature on teacher professional development (i.e., training teachers who are already on the job) highlight a few promising characteristics of effect

Doing Experiments with Socially Good but Privately Bad Treatments

David McKenzie's picture
Most experiments in development economics involve giving the treatment group something they want (e.g. cash, health care, schooling for their kids) or at least offering something they might want and can choose whether or not to take up (e.g. business training, financial education). Indeed among the most common justifications for randomization is that there is not enough of the treatment for everyone who wants it, leading to oversubscription or randomized phase-in designs.

Is the “conditional” in CCTs just a monitoring technology? Evidence from Brazil

David McKenzie's picture

The typical arguments made for the conditioning argument of CCTs are usually based on paternalism (people might have incorrect beliefs about the value of education, or parents may have incomplete altruism for their kids), externalities (the social returns to education exceed the private returns so individuals underinvest),   or political economy (it is easier to sell transfers to the voters if you make them conditional). A