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Russian Federation

Looking to the future: Ensuring better job opportunities for Tajikistan’s youth

Mohamed Ihsan Ajwad's picture
A significant share of Tajikistan’s workforce works outside the country. 
Photo: Gennadiy Ratushenko / World Bank

My colleague Victoria and I had an opportunity recently to meet with students at the Tajik-Russian Slavonic University in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, as part of our research and preparation for a new report called Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostic: Strategic Framework for Jobs.

Curious to learn about their future professional ambitions, we asked one class of students how many of them would like to work in the private sector after they graduate. Only about 10% of the students raised their hands. We also asked them how many would like to work for the government. This time, around 20% raised their hands.

Russia’s Migration Reforms – Learning to look at the Glass Half Full

Sudharshan Canagarajah's picture

The more I work on migration issues, I have come to realize the uniqueness of the CIS region migration phenomena. Migration in what is currently called the CIS region (the former Soviet Union) includes both migration within the region and external migration. Although the CIS countries are now nation states, they were earlier part of one country. The migration phenomena, therefore, existed for more than 70 years before the fall of Soviet Union in 1991. Despite being ethnically different, almost all speak Russians (although the fluency in Russian is declining over time, especially in the younger generation). There is substantial movement of goods and services and trade integration across the region.

Migrant remittances and private capital flows - Which is what?

Sanket Mohapatra's picture

The Uganda Daily Monitor reported recently that according to the World Bank’s latest Global Economic Prospects report, “remittances to developing countries is forecasted [sic] to recover modestly from $454 billion in 2009 to $771 billion by 2012, which still stands below the 2007 $1.2 trillion.” Since we produce the global remittances data and estimates (which incidentally show that remittance flows to developing countries

Photo © Curt Carnemark /  World Bank
reached $316 billion in 2009 and are forecast to grow by 6.2 percent to $335 billion in 2010 (see Migration and Development brief 12), the numbers in the Uganda Monitor made little or no sense to us. Until our colleague Andrew Burns, the lead author of the GEP 2010, pointed out that the Uganda Monitor has likely mistaken overall private capital flows to developing countries as remittances.

The issue of migrant remittances being confused with private capital flows (and even aid flows) is not new. Central banks all around the world have been struggling with this issue for several years now. A global survey of central banks that we conducted during 2008-09 suggests that central banks find it challenging to separate migrant remittances from other small-value transfers such as trade payments, small investments, and even transfers by/to non-governmental organizations and embassies.

Is Russia the second-largest sender of remittances? Or is it Saudi Arabia?

Ani Silwal's picture

Saudi Arabia was the second largest sender of remittances (after the United States) from 1988 to 2006. In 2007 and 2008, it was displaced by Russia as the second largest sender of remittances (figure 1). Flows from Russia have increased rapidly in recent years, reaching $26.1 billions in 2008. However, this rapid growth was interrupted in 2009, when remittance outflows fell by 29% to $18.6 billions in 2009. We don't have 2009 outflows data for Saudi Arabia yet but based on inflows data from Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines, Saudi Arabia's remittances outflows have not fallen much. Saudi Arabia was likely the second largest sender of remittances in 2009.

There are two possible explanations for why remittances from Saudi Arabia have been more stable than those from Russia (see Migration and Development Brief 12 for details). First, oil prices are more closely related to economic activity (thus, better employment prospects for migrants) in Russia than in Saudi Arabia. As major oil-exporters, both countries benefited from the surge in oil prices in the last few years. But only in Russia did remittance outflows move closely with oil prices (figure 2). This was not the case in Saudi Arabia, which has had ambitious development plans for a while and an aggressive counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Second, Russia’s borders with its neighbors are much more porous than those of Saudi Arabia, which enforces immigration quotas strictly. Russia’s porous borders have allowed migrants from neighboring countries to move in an out in response to changes in labor demand.