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Evaluation

The trial-and-error process of policymaking

Jim Manzi, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, recently wrote an article that contains perhaps the most incisive critique of randomized control trials (RCTs) I've seen so far. RCTs already have a long history in the social sciences within the U.S. (I was embarrassingly unaware of this fact even though I have spent a lot of time blogging about their use in the field of development.) Criminologists have tried to use them to figure out what might reduce recidivism, with little luck:

...since the early 1980s, criminologists increasingly turned to randomized experiments. One of the most widely publicized of these tried to determine the best way for police officers to handle domestic violence. In 1981 and 1982, Lawrence Sherman, a respected criminology professor at the University of Cambridge, randomly assigned one of three responses to Minneapolis cops responding to misdemeanor domestic-violence incidents: they were required to arrest the assailant, to provide advice to both parties, or to send the assailant away for eight hours. The experiment showed a statistically significant lower rate of repeat calls for domestic violence for the mandatory-arrest group. The media and many politicians seized upon what seemed like a triumph for scientific knowledge, and mandatory arrest for domestic violence rapidly became a widespread practice in many large jurisdictions in the United States.

The practical value of RCTs

Commenting on a post I wrote last month on randomized control trials (RCTs), Scott Guggenheim, a Lead Social Development Specialist at the World Bank, points out the practical value of this approach:

I've worked closely with several of the JPAL people to carry out randomized evaluations of our big community development programs in Indonesia and Afghanistan over the years. These evaluations have been extremely useful for improving our programs, and they've done it through findings that were both counterintuitive and which almost certainly could not have been obtained any other way. To cite one example, we did a big, RCT study on what reduces corruption in community programs. Whereas my entire team thought that increasing participation and transparency would be most effective, in actual fact increasing the frequency of locally publicized audits had far greater effects. That finding has now translated into a revised audit policy and procedure for $1.7 billion/yr in CDD investments. Surely this sort of work is both constructive and useful for development programs. Other RCTs are looking at what can improve community-state interactions in Afghanistan, MDG performance in Indonesia's poorest villages, and what incentives will lower police extortion. Again, surely these are positive and relevant -- and where it's important to be sure that we've nailed the right factors that explain them before we urge governments to translate them into national policies.

The whole comment is worth reading. Guggenheim is an authority in the field of social capital and community development, having done pioneering work in Indonesia via the Kecamatan Development Project.

The $35 laptop?

The Indian Express is reporting that India's Ministry of Human Resource Development is set to launch a $35 laptop:

Looking as stylish as a large i-phone, this $35 “low-cost computing-cum-access device” is a 5/7/9 inch touchscreen gadget packed with internet browsers, PDF reader, video conferencing facilities, open office, sci-lab, media player, remote device management capability, multimedia input-output interface option, and multiple content viewer.

Extending access to savings accounts via MFIs

Ziv on the India Development Blog makes the case:

While having MFIs hold deposits may be too drastic of a change to their business model for now, and it would introduce too much risk too soon, allowing them to offer a basic BC [business correspondent] service is an easy step that would have a large positive impact. As for accountability concerns, banks can use their discretion in selecting MFIs as BCs, working only with those having good track-records on process control. NBFCs are already entrusted with handling a large amount of bank cash through the SHG linkage framework, and misconduct has not emerged as a major interference.

Also see a related post on the PSD Blog about the efforts of the Gates Foundation to solve the microfinance savings riddle.

Seeking your questions for the roundtable on the role of the state in competitiveness

It is less than a week before the Promoting Competitiveness in Latin America and the Caribbean, hosted by the World Bank and the Mexican Ministry of Economy in Mexico City. More than 215 people have registered, including attendees from more than 20 different countries.

One of the events we are most excited about is the roundtable discussion, where discussants will address the question: what is the role of governments in promoting competitiveness? (See the latest agenda.) With the recent financial crisis having shifted the spectrum on the limits of acceptable government intervention, we are looking forward to a lively debate. We are fortunate to have a number of dynamic policymakers taking part in this roundtable: Costa Rica’s new Minister of Planning (and HBS professor) Laura Alfaro Maykall, Mexican Secretary of Economy Bruno Francisco Ferrari García de Alba, Uruguay’s Minister of Industry, Energy and Mining Roberto Kreinerman, Brazil’s Secretary of Economic Monitoring Antonio Henrique Silviera and the World Bank’s own Marcelo Giugale.

Doing industrial policy with limited government capacity

Responding to a post on Duncan Green's excellent From Poverty to Power blog, World Bank Chief Economist Justin Lin argues that his proposal for an updated version of industrial policy does not assume exceptional talent on the part of government institutions:

I certainly do not assume that “states possess a well informed, effective bureaucracy”. In fact development is a challenging process everywhere and all types of public policies and strategies—from education to health, from structuralist import substitution to Washington Consensus reforms—require some government capacity. However, the required capacity for the proposed Growth Identification and Facilitation framework is relatively minimal, compared to almost any other policy proposal: many of the specific instruments recommended in the paper are far easier to implement in low-capacity environments: setting up an export-processing zone for instance requires much less capacity than building infrastructure for the whole country as often advocated; implementing tax exemption schemes for a few years to attract investments in industries with latent comparative advantage is easier than collecting large tax revenues or repressing the financial system to subsidize nonviable firms for endless years in industries that are inconsistent with a country’s comparative advantage.

Does red tape not matter for firm productivity?

A new World Bank working paper finds that the answer, counterintuitively, is 'yes'. De Rosa et al. look at a large sample of firm-level surveys completed in 2009 and find that:

...while the payment of bribes is negatively associated with the productivity of the bribing firm, time spent dealing with bureaucratic requirements per se appears to be irrelevant.

This result is quite surprising, considering that managers of firms in many countries spend large chunks of time on pointless bureaucratic procedures. Should we give up on trying to slash regulatory burdens, contra this blog post by World Bank economist Mary Hallward-Driemeier? Not quite so fast!

Rotting rice

The WSJ reports on the troubles that seasonal rains have brought to northern India. The federal government had previously bought up large quantities of local wheat and rice, and now has no place to store it, so seasonal rains are washing the rice away or causing it to rot. One New Delhi-based think tank says that the solution is simply to bring in the private sector:

It is gross mismanagement and negligence...If only you had handed over the grain to the private sector, not a grain would have been lost. But now, it is nobody's grain.

The impact of impact evaluation

More high quality blogging over at Bill Easterly's Aid Watch. Guest blogger Alanna Shaikh asks what the limits of impact evaluation are:

If we limit all of our development projects to those that have easy metrics for success, we lose a lot of programs, many of which support important things like rule of law. Of course, if they don’t have useful metrics, how do we know those programs are supporting the important goals?

And how meaningful is impact evaluation anyway when you consider the short time frames we’re working with? Most development programs take ten years or more to show real impact. How are we supposed to bring that in line with government funding cycles?

On the other hand, we don’t have a lot of alternatives to impact evaluation. Impact is not unimportant just because it’s hard to quantify at times. We can’t wish that away.

Shaikh's blog post raises a lot of points that overlap with the heated debates that have followed the release of randomized control trials of microfinance. 

Beware the behavioralists

In a recent op-ed in the NYT, professors George Loewenstein and Peter Ubel take a swipe at behavioral economics:

But the field has its limits. As policymakers use it to devise programs, it’s becoming clear that behavioral economics is being asked to solve problems it wasn’t meant to address. Indeed, it seems in some cases that behavioral economics is being used as a political expedient, allowing policymakers to avoid painful but more effective solutions rooted in traditional economics.

Take, for example, our nation’s obesity epidemic. The fashionable response, based on the belief that better information can lead to better behavior, is to influence consumers through things like calorie labeling...because we lack the political will to change the price of junk food, we focus on consumer behavior.