This is a wonderful idea and a good first step. The zero rupee note appears to make use of the fear of the corruption being made transparent. I wonder if the more notes are distributed, the less the officials may fear the threat of their actions being made transparent (if everyone uses the notes, then you're back to square one)? The program also seems suited to a situation of small scale corruption, where the official is gaining little and possibly risking much, and they don't have the protection of higher-level perpetrators. I also wonder if corruption in India follows the typical pyramid structure, in which a portion of the money flows up the bureau's hierarchy. In that case, eventually, senior officials will either concede the point and try to make their money elsewhere, or they may simply instruct their underlings to ignore the notes. Finally, the program might be discredited and weakened in the courts. It would be easy to prove that someone gave an official a zero rupee note, but very difficult to prove that the official asked for a bribe. Is the injured citizen now open to an accusation of defamation? How many failed prosecutions of officials before officials begin to suspect that the notes don't really change the likelihood of punishment?