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Why ending violence is a development imperative

Ede Ijjasz-Vasquez's picture
Also available in: Español

Each year, about half a million people are killed by intentional homicide. That means one life is lost to violence per minute worldwide.

Latin America and Caribbean is among the hardest hit by chronic violence. Today, the region still sees an average rate of 24 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants—more than twice the World Health Organization (WHO)’s threshold for endemic violence.

If violence is an epidemic, youth are—by far—the largest risk group. In Latin America, the homicide rate for males aged 15-24 reaches 92 per 100,000, almost four times the regional average. Young people aged 25-29 years, predominately males, are also the main perpetrators of crime and violence, according to an upcoming World Bank report. 

Endemic violence also translates into less productivity, poorer health outcomes and high security costs. The cumulative cost of violence is staggering—up to 10% of GDP in some countries—with negative long-term consequences on human, social, economic, and sustainable development.

Ending violence is not only a must for law and justice, but also a development imperative.

The good news is that violence can be prevented. For example, cities like Medellin in Colombia and Diadema in Brazil have dramatically reduced homicide rate over the last few decades, thanks to tailored solutions backed by robust data analysis and a “whole-of-society” approach.  

In this video, we will discuss why violence is an important development issue, how countries and cities can effectively fight violence and crime, and what the World Bank and its partners are doing to ensure security and opportunity for all—especially youth and the urban poor. 

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What Should Illegal Logging and Illegal Fishing Have in Common?

Julian Lee's picture
Also available in: Español | Français
Fishing off the coast of Namibia. John Hogg/World BankThe value of the fishing and aquaculture industries exceeds US$190 billion annually and an estimated 240 million people depend on marine fisheries for their jobs. There’s no doubt that oceans generate big business. And where there’s profit to be made, there are sure to be people who don’t play by the rules. As a result, an estimated 18 percent of global fishing happens illegally.

Why should this matter to people who care about development? Illegal fishing can undermine the livelihoods of poor people who depend on the ocean to make a living. The evasion of tax and royalty regimes can deprive developing countries up to hundreds of millions of dollars a year in much-needed revenues. In some regions, the rate of illegal fishing is high enough to endanger the sustainable management of a resource already stressed by overfishing.

Democracy and Crime: An Old Question Awaiting New Answers

José Cuesta's picture
Also available in: Français | العربية | Español

The recent political unrest and violence occurring across the world have revived an old question, one that is so straightforward that it rarely gets a straightforward and convincing answer: Does democracy fuel or quench violence? For decades, sociologists, historians, political scientists, criminologists, and economists have hypothesized numerous associations, predicting just about any result.

Let’s focus on democracy’s relationship with crime. Democracies have been predicted to fuel crime (conflict theory); decrease crime (civilization theory); initially raise and then decrease crime (modernization perspective); have no impact at all (null hypothesis); or have an unpredictable impact depending on the development of their political institutions (comparative advantage theory).

In a recently published paper, I argue that the many existing explanations relating crime and democracy suffer from what I describe as an “identification” problem. The different explanations are not necessarily exclusionary in terms of their determinants, mechanisms, and predictions, which makes testing those explanations a rather difficult business. Furthermore, predictions are imprecise. This is unsurprising when dealing with concepts as fluid as democratization, political transitions, and democratic maturity. Arguments talk vaguely of early and late stages and of short or medium terms to describe the processes’ dynamics. The result is a broad range of predictions consistent with various hypotheses simultaneously.