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Ten Years after Lehman: Where are we now?

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt's picture

The tenth anniversary of the collapse of Lehman Brothers is a good opportunity for us all to reflect on the global financial crisis and the lessons we have learned from it. By now, there is widespread agreement that the crisis was caused by excessive risk-taking by financial institutions. There were increases in leverage and risk-taking, which took the form of excessive reliance on wholesale funding, lower lending standards, inaccurate credit ratings, and complex structured instruments. But why did it happen? How could such a crisis originate in the United States, home to arguably the most sophisticated financial system in the world? At the time, my colleagues and I argued incentive conflicts were at the heart of the crisis and identified reforms that would improve incentives by increasing transparency and accountability in the financial industry as well as government. After all, if large, politically powerful institutions regularly expect to be bailed out if they get into trouble, it is understandable that their risk appetite will be much higher than what is socially optimal.

Sowing the seeds for rural finance: The impact of support services for credit unions in Mexico

Miriam Bruhn's picture

Low and volatile agricultural incomes, poor connectivity, low population density and limited information are just a few reasons that have kept commercial banks away of rural areas in developing countries, where nonbank financial institutions (such as MFIs, cooperatives, or credit unions) have played an important role.

However, these rural institutions tend to be small and often suffer from bad risk management, poor governance, and weak technical and managerial capacity. These constraints are in turn passed on to the borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and credit rationing. The lack of human and organizational capital among lenders is a type of market failure where public interventions may be both effective and market friendly (Besley, 1994).

Solving Africa’s currency illiquidity problem

David Bee's picture

Some 41 currencies serve the African continent. Many of these are characterised by their illiquid and rarely traded status on the global financial market, as well as their volatility. So for those wishing to do business with Africa, these currencies — as difficult and expensive to source — can pose a real problem.

From the Namibian dollar to the Seychellois rupee, it is vital that organisations are able to source emerging market currencies reliably, on time, and at competitive prices. Yet such necessities often elude those trading with Africa, who view currency concerns as one of the biggest barriers to the development of Africa as an emerging — and therefore high growth — opportunity for international investors.

Benchmarking costs of financial intermediation around the world

Pietro Calice's picture
Bank financial intermediation plays a critical role in sustainable and inclusive growth. There is a considerable body of evidence showing that the extent to which an economy is making use of banking intermediation is not only associated with economic growth (Figure 1) and broader access to financial services (Figure 2) but it is a causal factor in explaining overall economic performance (see, for example, Levine, 2005), poverty reduction (e.g., Beck et al., 2007) and reduced inequality (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009).

Moving from financial access to health

Tilman Ehrbeck's picture

Over the past decade, the push for financial inclusion has united governments, companies, technology entrepreneurs, and nonprofit organizations in dozens of countries on every continent — and with remarkable success. In 2011, only 51 percent of the world’s adults had a formal bank account. By 2017, as the World Bank recently reported in its new Global Findex data, we’ve reached 69 percent — that is 1.2 billion more people who are now connected to the modern economy.

As more people in emerging markets gain access to the formal financial system — fueled by the increased penetration of the mobile phone and associated digital financial services — the pace of financial inclusion is accelerating. At this rate, we're on track to reach universal financial access by 2020, a goal set by the World Bank, which is an important success milestone.  Access to basic financial services, such as a bank account, credit, and insurance, is a crucial step in improving people's social and economic outlook. 

To Cap or not to cap? What does Kenya’s experience tell us about the impact of interest rate caps on the financial sector?

Bilal Zia's picture

Interest rate caps can have far-reaching consequences on the composition and maturity of commercial bank loans and deposits. From both a policy and research standpoint, it is important to understand the mechanisms behind such impacts and the channels through which they affect various players in the financial sector.

While cross-country evidence suggests that interest rate caps can reduce credit availability and increase costs for low-income borrowers1, rigorous micro-evidence on the channels of impact within an economy is missing.

In a new working paper that uses bank-level panel data from Kenya, Mehnaz Safavian and I carefully examine the impact of the recently imposed interest rate caps on the country’s formal financial sector.2

In September 2016, the Kenyan Parliament passed a bill that effectively imposed a cap on interest rates charged on loans and a corresponding floor on the interest rates offered for deposit accounts by commercial banks. This new legislation was in response to the public view that lending rates in Kenya were too high, and that banks were engaging in predatory lending behavior. The interest rate caps were therefore intended to alleviate the repayment burden on borrowers and improve financial inclusion as more individuals and firms would be able to borrow at the lower repayment rates.

Financial repression and bank lending: Evidence from a natural experiment in an emerging market

Tomás Williams's picture

Since the early 2000s, local-currency debt (mostly traded in domestic markets) became a growing and important source of funding for several governments in emerging market economies. Despite their impressive growth, many domestic sovereign debt markets maintain a captive domestic audience that facilitates direct credit to government. This represents a form of financial repression 1, which can lead to a crowding out of private credit.

The degree of this form of financial repression depends crucially on government access to foreign credit. If there is a low presence of foreign investors in domestic sovereign debt markets, governments have to rely heavily on domestic financial institutions potentially worsening the crowding out of private credit. In turn, an increased presence of foreign investors might reduce financial repression, and free resources for the private sector. As a result local firms may be able to finance more investment projects and boost economic activity. Although intuitive, there is little evidence on this topic because of identification challenges.2 In a recent study (Williams, 2018), I use a quasi-natural experiment in Colombia and provide evidence on how the entrance of foreign investors into domestic sovereign debt markets reduces financial repression and increases domestic credit growth, boosting economic activity.

Can psychometrics help bridge the gap?

Claudia Ruiz's picture
Traditional credit scores are fairly accurate in predicting future loan performance, which is why lenders have tended to concentrate on clients with already a solid credit history, as screening them is less costly. However, interest in alternative ways to identify potential good borrowers that lack credit history is growing, particularly in countries where a non-trivial fraction of the population remains unbanked.

The “accounting view” of money: money as equity (Part III)

Biagio Bossone's picture

In part I of this blog, we discussed the implications of our proposed “Accounting View” of money as it applies to legal tender. In part II, we further elaborated on the implications of the new approach, with specific reference to commercial bank money. We conclude our treatment of commercial bank money in this part, starting from where we left, that is, the double (accounting) nature of commercial bank (sight) deposits as debt or equity.

Bank deposits: debt, equity, or both…?

This double nature is stochastic in as much as, at issuance, every deposit unit can be debt (if, with a certain probability, the issuing bank receives requests for cash conversion or interbank settlement) and equity (with complementary probability). Faced with such a stochastic double nature, a commercial bank finds it convenient to provision the deposit unit issued with an amount of reserves that equals only the expected value of the associated debt event, rather than the full value of the deposit unit issued.

The “accounting view” of money: money as equity (Part II)

Biagio Bossone's picture

In part I of this blog, we discussed the implications of our proposed “Accounting View” of money as it applies to legal tender. In this part and the next, we elaborate on the implications of the new approach, with specific reference to commercial bank money.

Bank deposits and central bank reserves

After long being a tenet of post-Keynesian theories of money,1 even mainstream economics has finally recognized that commercial banks are not simple intermediaries of already existing money; they create their own money by issuing liabilities in the form of sight deposits (McLeay, Radia, and Thomas 2014).2

If banks create money, they do not need to raise deposits to lend or sell (Werner 2014). Still, they must avail themselves of the cash and reserves necessary to guarantee cash withdrawals from clients and settle obligations to other banks emanating from client instructions to mobilize deposits to make payments and transfers.

The relevant payment orders are only those between clients of different banks, since the settlement of payments between clients of the same bank (“on us” payments) does not require the use of reserves and takes place simply by debiting and crediting accounts held on the books of the bank.

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