A new Country Economic Memorandum gives us a chance to step back and look at the deep drivers of growth since Malawi’s independence in 1964. What stands out, though, is just how far Malawi has fallen behind its peers. It’s easy to look at the seemingly insurmountable challenges the country faces—from droughts and floods to the country’s landlocked status—yet other countries in the region have experienced just as many climate-related disasters, and overcome them better. And throughout the 50 plus years of its independence, Malawi has been fortunate to be at peace and mostly politically stable.
There are parallel and equally unsettling trends occurring worldwide: trust in media is falling as people are increasingly unable to discern credible information while trust in national governments worldwide (although with more pronounced distrust in developed countries) is also deteriorating.
The 2017 Edelman Barometer, for the first time, found that three-quarters of the 28 countries surveyed were categorized as “distrustful” of government, business, media and non-governmental organizations.
Globally, public confidence in institutions has dropped by more in the past year than in any other since the financial crisis in 2009. Media are seen as part of the elite class, who govern.
Trust in media plunged from 51% to 43%, an all-time low for the index, with the sharpest falls in Australia, Canada, Colombia, and Ireland. As the reputation of traditional media declines, people are shifting towards the internet for news, the results showed. Online search engines were deemed more reliable than traditional media for information, a reversal from five years ago.
Likewise, a survey of 300 government communication chiefs from 40 countries, found there has been considerable declines in trust for national governments. The study, entitled Leader’s Report: The Future of Government Communications, finds that just as the internet has transformed media, it has also transformed the role of government as providers of information. Governments are now struggling to keep pace with how modern voters gather information and form their opinions. since governments rely on the consent and trust of the people for their legitimacy and authority, falling levels of trust in government is a key issue facing government communicators.
These trends simultaneously reinforce one another, inhibiting dialogue among citizens and with the government, contributing to disengagement among publics, and impeding policies that require informed publics.
So, what is a citizen to do if they’d like to cut through the noise to see more transparency and accountability? Australian journalist Claire Connelly offers this concise, erudite answer: be vocal, participate, and check facts because democracy only works if we show up.
Sue Unsworth’s work provides us a wealth of knowledge on governance and institutional change, stemming largely from her ‘upside down’ view of the conventional reality of the aid world. Here is a quick peek into some of her work – particularly, insights into how donor-approaches should evolve to engage successfully with politics.
Sue’s work with David Booth – captured in this paper, Politically smart, locally led development – presents seven case studies of problem-driven approaches that provide important lessons to donors, as well as a clear message that merely using new terminology without actually changing the ‘ways of working will not yield results. The authors suggest that chasing ‘international best practices’ often lead to imagined solutions that do not address the problem at hand.
"…for politically smart, locally led approaches to become the norm, a more radical shift is needed in the way donors conceive development challenges and their role in addressing them. They need to abandon oversimplified concepts of ‘ownership’ and ‘partnership’, and unrealistic assumptions about the scope for outsiders to lead transformational change"
Two decades ago, when I was working on utility sector reform we knew the answer. Here (using the example of electricity) is what it was: unbundle generation, transmission and distribution; introduce an independent regulator; rebalance prices; privatize. Two decades later, we have learned the stark limits of orchestrating reforms on the basis of ‘best practice’ blueprints such as these.
What would a more ‘with the grain’ approach to electricity sector reform look like? To explore this, I asked my Johns Hopkins SAIS and University of Cape Town students to review how a variety of country efforts unfolded in practice – focusing specifically on efforts to introduce private sector participation into electricity generation. Some striking patterns emerged. Here I contrast South Africa’s experience with those of Kenya, Peru and Lebanon. The former illustrates powerfully the hazards of ‘best practice’ reforms; the latter point to the promise of more incremental, cumulative, with the grain approaches.
In 1997, an official South African report signaled that in 2008 the lights would go out if there was no new investment in electricity generation; the report proposed that the country embark on a far-reaching effort to implement the ‘best practices’ template for electricity sector reform, constraining the dominant parastatal, ESKOM, and turning to the private sector for new investment in electricity generation. In 1998, the government adopted the report’s recommendations. In her richly-researched Masters dissertation (available on the link that follows), Nchimunya Hamukoma detailed what happened next.
Contestation over the agenda among competing factions within the ruling African National Congress and its allies interacted with a hugely-ambitious reform design — one for which almost none of the requisite political, institutional, economic and organizational capabilities were in place. The result was that after six futile years of trying, the effort at restructuring and private participation was abandoned, and ESKOM was given a green light to invest in new capacity. But the six lost years – the result of futilely pursuing an unachievable ‘best practice’ chimera – had an inevitable consequence. In 2008, as predicted, the lights went out.
Earlier this month I headed off for the London launch of the 2016 World Development Report, ‘Digital Dividends’. The World Bank’s annual flagship is always a big moment in wonkland, and there has been a lot of positive buzz around this one.
Here’s how the Bank summarizes its content (Frequently Asked Questions, pg. 5):
"What is the Report about? It explores the impact of the internet, mobile phones, and related technologies on economic development.
What are the digital dividends? Growth, jobs, and services are the most important returns to digital investments." (pg. 5)
How do digital technologies promote development and generate digital dividends? By reducing information costs, digital technologies greatly lower the cost of economic and social transactions for firms, individuals, and the public sector. They promote innovation when transaction costs fall to essentially zero. They boost efficiency as existing activities and services become cheaper, quicker, or more convenient. And they increase inclusion as people get access to services that previously were out of reach.
Why does the Report argue that digital dividends are not spreading rapidly enough? For two reasons. First, nearly 60 percent of the world’s people are still offline and can’t fully participate in the digital economy. There also are persistent digital divides across gender, geography, age, and income dimensions within each country. Second, some of the perceived benefits of the internet are being neutralized by new risks. Vested business interests, regulatory uncertainty, and limited contestation across digital platforms could lead to harmful concentration in many sectors. Quickly expanding automation, even of mid-level office jobs, could contribute to a hollowing out of labor markets and to rising inequality. And the poor record of many e-government initiatives points to high failure of ICT projects and the risk that states and corporations could use digital technologies to control citizens, not to empower them.
This is a three-part series from Brian Levy on the manner in which the media, activists and politicians talk about the role of government. This post focuses on the importance of engaged democratic debate and the rhetorical traps that can derail political discussions.
I’ve been thinking a lot in recent months about how we talk about government. So, spurred on in part by the truly appalling tone of discourse in the Republican Party’s nomination contest, I’ve decided to write a few United States-centric blog posts on the subject (though I’ll stay away entirely from chauvinistic slurs, or comments about ‘walls’ or ‘roads to serfdom’).
Somehow, in the area of governance, our usual ways of measuring (and honoring) human endeavor don’t seem to apply. Ordinarily, working and playing in teams teaches us how to master the challenges of co-operative, collective achievement — which can be way, way harder than striving alone. Governing is a quintessentially collective endeavor, especially in democracies. Yet all too often the discourse (and not only by nameless plutocrat presidential candidates…..) is resonant of F. Scott Fitzgerald’s description of Tom and Daisy in The Great Gatsby:
“They were careless people….. They smashed up things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or their vast carelessness or whatever it was that kept them together, and let other people clean up the mess they had made.”
In a series of complementary blog posts — on Washington’s Metro on Obamacare;, and on South Africa’s public sector — I explore some consequences of our carelessness in the way we speak about the public sector. Here I focus on the underlying logic of the conversation. A good place to begin is with the analysis of institutions.
The great institutional economist, Douglass North, defined institutions formally as “humanly devised constraints which govern human interaction”. (‘Rules of the game’ is his classic, informal definition.) Another Nobel-prize-winning economist, Oliver Williamson, built on North’s definition. “Governance”, Williamson suggested, “is an effort to craft order, thereby to mitigate conflict and realize mutual gains”. Crafting governance arrangements for the public sector is hard – much harder, Williamson emphasizes, than governing a private firm. Yet, somehow, seduced by high-sounding bromides, we trivialize the challenge. We gloss over the complexities, imply that what is extraordinarily difficult should be straightforward, and end up fueling disappointment and despair. The result is the pervasive distrust of government evident across much of the industrialized world.
Our Top Ten blog posts by readership in 2014.
This post was originally posted on January 29, 2014
Around the end December of every year, the pundits start coming out with their forecasts for 2014. This past December, the World Bank pundits predicted everything from girls outperforming boys in developing countries (girl power!) to the staggering idea that for Europe, 2014 will be a better year.
This year though, the World Bank’s Future Development Forecasts blog, included a prediction that caught these two political scientists by surprise— “as more and more economists point to the primary [sic] of politics in development, political scientists will wake up and wonder why they have been left out of the discussion.”
Joel Hellman, the World Bank’s Director of the Center on Conflict, Security and Development in Nairobi (OPSFN), predicted there will be a new movement of “political contextualists.” Meaning: we as development practitioners have to take a look at the broader institutional framework influencing the performance of the economy, and on development in particular. This is particularly relevant with regard to governance reform and strengthening institutions and service delivery in countries.
Politics in development, hear, hear! The World Bank’s People, Spaces and Deliberation blog has been making this case for years. Nevertheless, neither economists nor political scientists have really introduced a convincing framework for how this political contextualization would play out in development: how it influences development and how it helps us understand strategies that promote development effectiveness and the efficiency of development interventions.
It is easy to see that data is crucial to the agency’s operations. Sitting down with EDL’s employees and managers—all wearing the agency’s signature blue-shirt uniform with pride—it also becomes apparent that the science of numbers and the art of managing people have gone hand in hand at this agency. This combination has enabled EDL to make organizational learning a central pillar of the agency’s success.
Institutions Taking Root, a recent report of which I’m a co-author, looked at nine successful institutions in fragile and conflict-affected states that share a core set of internal operational strategies.
DFID really is an extraordinary institution. I spent Monday and Tuesday at the annual get together one of its professional cadres – about 200 advisers on governance and conflict. They were bombarded with powerpoints from outside speakers (including me), but still found time for plenty of ‘social loafing’, aka networking with their mates. Some impressions:
They are hugely bright and committed, wrestling to get stuff done in some of the most difficult places on the planet, familiar with all the dilemmas of ‘doing aid’ in complex environments that I talk about endlessly on this blog. A visitor muttered about the quality and nuance of discussion compared to the uncritical can-do hubris of much of what they hear in Washington.
In fact, since the Australians and Canadians wound up their development departments, DFID looks pretty well unique in the international scene – heroic keeper of the flame or aid’s Lonesome George heading for species extinction? We’ll find out over the next few years.