Globally, India ranks fourth in energy consumption, but it is not well endowed with energy resources. Being the second most populous country in the world, how India manages its industrialization and urbanization process will matter for national and global concerns about energy efficiency, pollution, and climate change. In a recent paper, we use enterprise data to look at the relationship between structural transformation, geography, and energy efficiency in India.
After years of bad news from developing countries about high rates of health worker absenteeism, and low rates of delivery of key health interventions, along came what seemed like a magic bullet: financial incentives. Rather than paying providers whether or not they show up to work, and whether or not they deliver key interventions, doesn’t it make sense to pay them—at least in part—according to what they do? And if, after doing their cost-benefit calculations, women decide not to have their baby delivered in a health facility, not to get antenatal care, and not take their child to be immunized, then doesn’t it make sense to try to change the benefit-cost ratio by paying them to do so?
Last month, the World Bank and IMF both put out predictions that, this year, India would overtake China in terms of GDP growth rate. This caused a flutter and was widely reported around the world. How robust is this prediction and what does it really mean?
First, this is not as monumental a milestone as some commentators made it out to be. China has had one of the most remarkable growth runs witnessed in human history, having exceeded an annual growth of 9% from 1980 to now. Four decades ago its per capita income was close to India’s, but now it is four times as large as India’s. None of all this is going to change in a hurry.
With this caveat in mind, it is a year in which India deserves to feel good. It is expected to top the World Bank’s chart of growth rates in major nations of the world. This has never happened before. Before 1990, India did occasionally grow faster than China, mainly because China’s growth gyrated wildly during the pre-Deng Xiaoping period. It was, for instance, minus 27% in 1961, when Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward resulted in the world’s biggest famine, and it was 17% and 19% in 1969 and 1970, respectively--a relief in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Fluctuations of this magnitude would be intolerable to India’s polity.