What happens when you wake up one morning to discover that the institution responsible for delivering your country's social protection portfolio no longer exists — and yet programs must keep moving?
In late April 2023, this question became real for us on the social protection team in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Without prior communication, news reports revealed that the Fonds Social de la République Démocratique du Congo (FSRDC) — the country's main platform for delivering social assistance — was dissolved by presidential ordinance. The information reached our team, and even FSRDC's own management, only days later.
At the time of its dissolution, the FSRDC was managing three World Bank–financed projects worth nearly US$1.2 billion, including a social protection portfolio of approximately US$820 million (DRC Eastern Recovery Project -STEP project). Social protection program was abruptly put on hold. About 350,000 beneficiaries temporarily stopped receiving cash transfers and 500 community infrastructures -mainly primary schools and health centers- was suspended. Key activities remained paused for more than six months, before benefits gradually resumed. Overnight, the institutional backbone of social protection delivery in one of Africa's most fragile countries was gone.
What followed was not just an operational crisis. It was a stress test — one that exposed deep vulnerabilities in how delivery platforms are built in fragile and conflict affected contexts, with lessons extending well beyond the DRC.
A Model Built for Crisis — and Its Limits
Social funds like the FSRDC were born in crisis. Developed with World Bank support in late 1980s, they were designed to channel resources quickly to poor communities when mainstream systems could not.
Their strength was speed and flexibility. They could operate with a degree of autonomy that allowed them to move fast, innovate, and deliver at the local level. Over time, many of these funds evolved from community infrastructure into broader social assistance systems — public works, cash transfers, and productive inclusion programs.
Some made the transition successfully. Tanzania's TASAF and Madagascar's FID adapted and became pillars of national social protection systems. Others struggled -and were eventually dissolved.
The FSRDC fell into this second group — not because it failed to deliver, but because it never fully transitioned from crisis instrument to a permanent part of the state. It accumulated vast operational responsibilities while remaining outside the regular ministerial structures, creating friction with line ministries. Heavy reliance on external financing left it without a sustainable financial base, while governance arrangements failed to keep pace with its growing responsibilities.
The dissolution of the FSRDC taught us three critical lessons for anyone working in fragile contexts.
Autonomy is a feature, until it becomes a vulnerability
The FSRDC delivered. During Ebola, COVID-19, and multiple conflict-related shocks, it scaled up cash transfers and labor-intensive public works quickly, reaching communities others could not. But autonomy without a strong legal anchor and integration with government ministries is not resilience; it’s just fragility by another name. When political winds shifted, there was no institutional anchor to hold the FSRDC in place. The lesson is that autonomous social funds must be protected by robust governance and strong political ownership.
Unplanned transitions do not eliminate risk
When implementation paused, the costs were immediate. Payments to families were delayed, construction sites halted, and grievances surged aimed widespread uncertainty. These were real welfare losses, borne entirely by vulnerable families. Institutional reform is often necessary, but it must be planned. Transitional arrangements-bridge financing, interim mandates and clear accountability—are essential to shield beneficiaries from disruption.
Crises, if managed well, can accelerate long-overdue reforms
Paradoxically, the disruption also created space for progress. The transition forced a shift toward re-anchoring social protection within government. The Ministry of Social Affairs (MINAS) assumed a leadership role it had previously lacked, supported by capacity-building through the STEP project. A national social protection policy for non-contributory programs was adopted, and the social registry-once a project tool- was institutionalized by government decree. None of this would have happened as quickly under normal conditions. The lesson is that a crisis can be an opportunity to build something stronger, not just to restore the status quo.
Where do we go from here?
The collapse of the FSRDC was a shock, but it also brought clarity. The priority is not to rebuild a parallel structure, but to strengthen the government capacity to lead—to translate policy into programs, coordinate across ministries, and oversee delivery.
Equally important, the focus must shift from short‑term coping to longer‑term opportunity. The next phase of social protection in the DRC must connect safety nets to pathways toward income generation, productivity, and jobs—especially for youth, women, and displaced populations.
The FSRDC’s story is not one of failure. It is the story of a system that outgrew its foundations, and of a country that now has the chance to build something more durable in its place.
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