Over the last decade, both Kenya and Liberia have sought to scale up successful pilot programs that help children to learn to read. Even as more and more impact evaluations are of programs at scale, pilots still constitute a significant portion of what we test. That’s with good reason: Governments wisely seek to pilot and test programs before expending valuable resources in implementing a program across the country. Last year, I wrote about how the Indian organization Pratham worked with J-PAL to test effective programs to improve reading iteratively, varying different parameters in terms of who was implementing (government teachers versus volunteers) and when (in-school versus during the holidays).
There are a multitude of government programs that directly try to help particular firms to grow. Business training is one of the most common forms of such support. A key concern when thinking about the impacts of such programs is whether any gains to participating firms come at the expense of their market competitors. E.g. perhaps you train some businesses to market their products slightly better, causing customers to abandon their competitors and simply reallocate which businesses sell the product. This reallocation can still be economically beneficial if it improves allocative efficiency, but failure to account for the losses to untrained firms would cause you to overestimate the overall program impact. This is a problem for most impact evaluations, which randomize at the individual level which firms get to participate in a program.
In a new working paper, I report on a business training experiment I ran with the ILO in Kenya, which was designed to measure these spillovers. We find over a three-year period that trained firms are able to sell more, without their competitors selling less – by diversifying the set of products they produce and building underdeveloped markets.
Teachers’ attendance can be improved if they are monitored by head-teachers using mobile technology, but only if the associated reports trigger bonus payments.
Can high-stakes decentralized monitoring improve civil servant performance, or will it lead to collusion between the monitor and civil servant? And what happens to the quality of information when we raise the stakes of reports?
This is the second in our series of posts by students on the job market this year.
In 2013 alone, donors pledged $31 billion to support financial inclusion programs—an attempt to deliver financial services to the 2 billion adults that do not have access to such services. In the past, microcredit and insurance programs received all of the attention, but improving the savings capacity of the poor and unbanked has recently drawn increasing attention as well. Access to a savings account has been shown to improve account holders' overall financial situation and their ability to cope with shocks. In addition, access to savings may also lead to greater educational aspirations and completion of additional years of schooling for the children of account holders.
So say 87% of the respondents in a survey used by Dupas and Robinson in an interesting forthcoming paper on what happens when you help people get set up with bank accounts in Kenya. And, as we will see, this problem seems to be particularly acute for women.