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Security spending is on the rise in several regions in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, in contexts of growing insecurity, there is a need for better management and efficient spending. Security institutions often suffer from the same human resource and public financial management challenges as other state institutions.
In conflict-affected contexts, restoring security is the first priority for local populations and is a pre-requisite to achieve stability that can in turn lead to growth and socioeconomic development. But the recent World Bank paper on Governance in the 21st Century in Sub-Saharan Africa reminds us that conflict is costly for growth. According to the International Monetary Fund conflicts result in an annual growth deficit of 2.5 percentage points on average. Conflicts have a negative impact on public finances because they lower revenue, and lead to an increase in military expenditure. This can divert precious resources from where they are needed most to help people.
Security spending has been on the rise across most conflict-affected countries in Africa, particularly in the Sahel since 2019. In Mali and Burkina Faso, security expenditures have increased by 66 percent and 138 percent respectively over the last five years. Since 2020, there has also been a resurgence of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa, across the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger) but also in countries like Sudan, Guinea, and Gabon. The context of these coups varies substantially; yet several common factors emerge, including failing social contracts, insecurity, and the militarization of politics. We have noticed that the coups were preceded with occurrences of dissatisfaction and a lack of perceived legitimacy of governments.
Despite security spending increases and the emergence of military regimes in several Sub-Saharan African countries, violence remains high, especially in West and East Africa. In the Sahel, for instance, violence remains consistently high compared to pre-coup levels. According to ACLED data, there has been a steady increase of recorded fatalities in the region since 2019 with civilians paying a heavy price amid the uptick of violence.
How can this trend be explained?
Some voices express the view that several coups are a “by-product of the imbalanced aggrandizement of their armed forces in the face of serious security”. This is often a consequence of national security institutions that are in a growing state of decay with poor management of human resources, widespread corruption, and poor financial management practices.
In the case of the Sahel countries, the divide between soldiers and junior ranks and the ‘old guard’, can be attributed to nepotism, unfair systems of rewards and promotions and opaque management of human resources. Corruption and embezzlement of wages, living allowances, rations, and equipment is not unusual within units, which leads to parallel chains of command. This is the case in numerous FCV countries. In such settings, salaries, and rations usually account for most of the recurrent security spending.
Somalia is an illuminating example of a context of growing insecurity that needs better management and efficient spending. Somalia has been able to reduce costs by 50 percent by reforming procurement of rations. Overall, central purchasing contracts for all major army supplies resulted in massive savings for the country’s budget. Biometric registration of soldiers and payments through bank accounts and mobile money has also enabled improved payments. In only a few years, Somalia moved from “duffle bag” distribution of soldiers’ salary payments to electronic payment.
In conclusion, security institutions are not insulated from other state institutions. They often suffer from the same human resources and public financial management challenges as non-security institutions. Institutional weaknesses within the security sector are usually exacerbated by a greater lack of transparency. Unfortunately, despite common development challenges, traditional donors tend to stay away from the security sector whereas analytical work at minima could be possible.
This may warrant a re-think given the direct and negative correlation to the social contract between citizens and state, and to growth and overall development outcomes.
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